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Abstract
The objective of this thesis is bipartite. Firstly, we examine the effect of working
capital management on return on invested capital for Norwegian companies. Secondly, we
attempt to explain the differences in working capital management between publicly listed
and privately owned companies from the perspective of agency theory. More concisely, we
want to investigate whether the distinctive characteristics of these two ownership structures
cause different exposure to agency costs, and subsequently different cash conversion cycles.
In our analysis, based on a panel of 1,129 Norwegian companies in the period from
2014 to 2018, we have found that there is a negative relationship between the cash
conversion cycle and return on invested capital. These results were highly expected,
considering the findings of the existing literature on this topic in other geographical
markets. Moreover, we see that the drivers for this effect are mainly the management
of receivables and inventory. Furthermore, we have identified significant differences in
working capital practice between publicly listed and privately owned companies in Norway.
In the last part of the analysis, we attempt to explain this discrepancy from an agency
theory perspective. Based on our findings, there are some indications of an unexpected
negative relationship between agency costs and the cash conversion cycle, but we cannot
say anything conclusive the on extent to which this causes the inconsistencies in working
capital policies. However, we are of the persuasion that there should be a theoretical link.
Hence, we believe that this is an interesting path to follow for future research on working
capital management.
Keywords – Working Capital Management, Agency Cost, Public, Private
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11 Introduction
In June 2000, one of the largest listed corporations in the US learned the merciless
lesson of the impact of working capital negligence. The respected bond broker, Ravi Sauri,
dropped the bomb in the form of a pointed warning against the Amazon stock. The
basis on which the warning was made was: “weak balance sheet, poor working capital
management, and massive negative operating cash flow”. In the following days, the
shareholders responded by fleeing the company, leaving the stock at one-third of the
value prior to the statement by Mr. Sauri. According to both the Washington Post and
the Wall Street Journal, the main driver behind the stock-price crash was poor working
capital management, leaving this as a strong example of how severe the consequences of
neglecting the importance of working capital can be (Carlton, 2000; Schwartz, 2000).
Eight years later, another shock struck the world of finance, but this time on a
totally different scale. The global financial crisis of 2008 is one of the most severe of its
kind in modern time, as it drove numerous stock exchanges into the ground and drained
liquidity (Moessner and Allen, 2010). As a consequence, working capital management
received increasing attention from financial executives in companies all around the world
(Nuhiu and Dërmaku, 2017). Companies of all sizes experienced severe financial distress
during this period due to lack of liquidity, and turned to their balance sheets and found a
solution in form of more efficient working capital management. This enabled companies
to generate funds internally and remain solvent. In general, the apparent advantage of
increased liquidity is that more significant cash balances make companies more reliable
and robust in regard to debt obligations. In addition, companies with more cash on
hand have the flexibility to pursue profitable investment opportunities. However, as the
economic situation stabilised, working capital returned to its former state as a more subtle
performance indicator.
In a survey carried out by the Norwegian consulting firm Norsk Arbeidskapital,
80% of the CFOs asked acknowledged that working capital is an integral part of the
company’s financial performance. However, the same report unveils that 85% of those
who recognise working capital as important say that they do not have proper monitoring
2tools in place (NorskArbeidskapital, 2017). In later years, PWC has carried out multiple
studies on working capital management globally, in the Nordic countries and in Norway
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2015, 2017, 2019). These reports suggest that there is still
untapped potential regarding working capital management all around the world, and in
the Nordics notably. What seems to be the main problem in Norway is not the awareness
per se, but rather the lack of sufficient monitoring tools and the proper incentives. As of
now, working capital seems to remain a neglected measurement of financial performance.
Nevertheless, there are several examples showing that efficient management of working
capital is critical for the survival of companies (Jafari et al., 2014).
The relationship between working capital management and corporate profitability has
been subjected to thorough investigation in the field of financial research (Shin and Soenen,
1998; Deloof, 2003; Lazaridis and Tryfonidis, 2006; Hawawini et al., 1986). The findings
imply that when net working capital decreases (increases), company profitability increases
(decreases). However, opinions in the world of academia vary greatly. There are several
examples of studies indicating that increasing investments in working capital could benefit
the financial performance of companies (Paul and Wilson, 2007; Schwartz, 1974; Blazenko
and Vandezande, 2003). In addition, the findings of PWC seem somewhat contradictory
to the purposed negative relationship between working capital and profitability. As can
be seen, Norwegian companies hold particularly high levels of working capital, relative to
their international peers. There are potentially two explanations for this phenomenon.
The first is that the financial incentives of Norwegian companies differ from the rest.
Alternatively, Norwegian companies are exposed to excessive working capital due to a lack
of rationality and proper incentives for managers.
There is a gap in the literature regarding how the working capital policies of public and
private companies differ. The case of Amazon provides an example of how the shareholders
severely punish management’s mistakes. However, owners of private companies are not
subject to the same external monitoring. Hence, they are not able to react in the same way
as shareholders in listed companies. In the graph below, we display how the average net
working capital to total assets differs between public and private companies in Norway:
3Figure 1.1:
The Cash Conversion Cycle of Public and Private Companies
As is evident from the graph, there is a systematical difference in the net working
capital levels between public and private companies. In the further analysis, we will
attempt to explain this discrepancy from the perspective of agency theory, as we believe
there are fundamental differences that facilitate unequal exposure to agency costs, which
subsequently affects working capital management (Jensen, 1986; Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira
and Vilela, 2004). Accordingly, the research question of this thesis is as follows:
Can the Agency Problem explain the difference in the cash conversion cycles
of Norwegian public and private companies?
Our analysis in chapter 4 is divided into two parts. Firstly, we will apply panel data
regression in order to investigate the economic impact of working capital management
on profitability for Norwegian companies on an aggregated level. In the second part of
the analysis, we attempt to explain the discrepancy in the cash conversion cycle between
public and private firms. We believe the difference originates from unequal presence of
agency costs and we use two different shocks to test this hypothesis: the deregulation of
the accounting practice on the Oslo Stock Exchange, and the replacement of CFOs in
4publicly listed companies. To estimate the effects, we adopt the Difference-in-Difference
methodology.
The results of our analysis of the relationship between the cash conversion cycle
and return on invested capital indicate that the negative relationship found by several
other researchers also holds for Norwegian companies (Deloof, 2003; Shin and Soenen,
1998; Lazaridis and Tryfonidis, 2006). Furthermore, we observe that companies with
longer cash conversion cycles have more substantial marginal effects on return on invested
capital. These results are in accordance with our expectations, and consistent with the
findings of existing literature (Juan García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2007; Valipour
et al., 2012). We find that there is a consistent discrepancy in the cash conversion cycles
between public and private companies, and that the marginal effect of working capital
management on return on invested capital differs between the two groups. Further, we
investigate whether these differences can be explained by different exposure to agency
costs. In our results, we are able to identify some links between agency cost and working
capital. Moreover, further analyses reveal an unexpected negative relationship between
the two. However, due to unclear results and absence of statistical significance, we cannot
say anything conclusive about the whether there are differences in agency costs between
public and private firms and if these explain the observed inconsistency in working capital
management. Theoretically, we do believe a link exist, and we are of the opinion that this
should be further investigated by future research.
Through this thesis, we believe we have made several contributions to the existing
research. Firstly, we have added to the already extensive base of research on the effect
of the cash conversion cycle on profitability by documenting a negative relationship for
Norwegian companies. In addition, we have provided support to the notion that the
marginal return of the cash conversion cycle on corporate profitability increases with
the length of companies’ cash conversion cycles. Secondly, and more importantly, we
have discovered substantial differences in how public and private companies manage their
working capital, and how their respective cash conversion cycles affect return on invested
capital. Thirdly, we have addressed the agency cost as a potential explanation for the
differences between public and private companies, and laid out extensive argumentation
for why this should be the case. Although the results of our analysis are ambiguous in
5that regard, we have provided some indications that agency costs do have an effect on the
cash conversion cycle.
The thesis will be structured in the following way. In the next chapter, we will
elaborate on the findings of existing literature on the matter of working capital and agency
theory. Based on this review, we will further formulate our hypotheses. The third chapter
focuses on the data used in this thesis, and elaborates on the methodology used in the
analyses. It will contain a conceptual description of the various techniques applied, and
also enlarge on our motivation for the chosen approach. In the fourth chapter, we present
and discuss the results of our analyses, while the fifth and final chapter presents our
conclusion and discusses the relevant limitations of this thesis. In addition, we will provide
guidance for future research on this topic.
62 Literature Review
2.1 Corporate Profitability, CCC and Agency Costs
Our intention with this thesis is to explore the differences in working capital
management policies between publicly listed and privately owned companies in Norway.
The relationship between the cash conversion cycle and corporate profitability has been
extensively investigated in the existing literature (Deloof, 2003; Shin and Soenen, 1998;
Lazaridis and Tryfonidis, 2006; Nzioki et al., 2013). However, there is, to our knowledge,
no research that makes an explicit distinction between public and private firms. In the
analysis of the second objective, we will therefore apply an approach of a more theoretical
nature.
The cash conversion cycle is a measure of the number of days it takes for the company
to convert a dollar of expenditure to a dollar of cash inflow (Richards and Laughlin, 1980).
In our analysis, we will be using the cash conversion cycle as a proxy for the efficiency
of companies’ working capital management. The cash conversion cycle is acknowledged
as a reliable metric in the literature (Deloof, 2003; Richards and Laughlin, 1980; Jose
et al., 1996; Ebben and Johnson, 2011; Keown, 2004), and also has the advantage of
isolating the specific sub-components of working capital management. By breaking the
cash conversion cycle into days sales outstanding (DSO), days inventory outstanding
(DIO) and days payables outstanding (DPO), we are able to carry out a more nuanced
analysis on how efficiently different companies manage each specific component. The
reason why we believe this is a valuable trait is the vast difference in the nature of each
metric. Considering working capital on an aggregated level, it is difficult to say where
potential inefficiencies are located. Subsequently, the decision on which actions to take
remains a puzzle. In addition, the breakdown of the cash conversion cycle allows for
analysis of how management of the different components affects the financial performance
of the company. In a scenario where companies’ resources are scarce, and priorities are
necessary, such a decomposition is useful in order to make economically rational decisions.
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Figure 2.1:
The Cash Conversion Cycle
To proceed with our initial research question, establishing a connection between the
cash conversion cycle and financial performance is a necessary prerequisite. To put the
issue of working capital management in a context where it is of relevance for companies’
management, there needs to be a financial incentive attached. Otherwise, it would be
rational to channel managements’ time and resources elsewhere. In our assessment of the
relationship between the cash conversion cycle and the financial performance, we have
focused on return on invested capital as a measure of corporate profitability. The rationale
behind the choice of return on invested capital is to isolate the effect of working capital
management on the operational aspects of the business (Deloof, 2003; Petersen et al.,
2017). Contrary to gross profit, used by Deloof (2003), the return on invested capital
metric captures operational activities other than those directly related to sales. The use
of return on invested capital also excludes the impact of the companies’ capital structure
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Intuitively, the link between investments in working capital
and profitability is related to the costs of managing receivables and payables, as well
as physical storage costs and management costs of inventories. Moreover, a reduction
in the cash conversion cycle will lead to a reduction in these costs. On the other hand,
there are other less pronounced ways in which working capital management could affect
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profitability, and we will touch upon these in later sections. In figure 2.2, we illustrate
how working capital and profitability are directly connected.
Figure 2.2:
The Relationship between Working Capital and Profitability
In the relationship between agency cost and working capital, the focus has been on
using agency theory to explain inefficiencies in companies’ working capital management.
Up until now, the literature has focused on the relationship between agency costs and
cash retention, and how this affects the cash conversion cycle (Jensen, 1986; Opler et al.,
1999; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). The misalignment of incentives between managers and
shareholders has been emphasised as one of the core reasons why these costs occur (Brealey
et al., 2012; Harris and Raviv, 1996). Another explanation for the observed agency costs is
asymmetric information between the management and the headquarters (Hubbard, 1997).
In addition, several researchers have directed their attention towards control mechanisms
to restrain the extent of agency costs. Firstly, budget constraints are used as a way of
controlling the management in the case of diverging interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Secondly, increasing corporate debt can be argued as having a disciplining effect as it
limits the free cash flow which the management has at its disposal (Ang et al., 2000).
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In subsequent sections of this chapter, we aim to further elaborate on the relationship
between the cash conversion cycle and corporate profitability, and how the agency theory
plays a role in the determination of both this relationship and the length of the cash
conversion cycle. In the first part, we will present arguments for why a shortening of the
cash conversion cycle has a positive effect on the profitability of companies. Secondly,
we look at explanations for the opposite. Thirdly, there will be a section on structural
differences between public and private companies, and how the agency problem can be
connected to these differences. Finally, we state the hypotheses which make up the
foundation for our thesis.
2.2 Shorter Cash Conversion Cycle and Improved
Profitability
In the literature, two factors stand out as the explanations for the relationship between
working capital management and corporate profitability. Firstly, more efficient working
capital management implies better liquidity (Shin and Soenen, 1998; Mathuva, 2015).
Secondly, companies with shorter cash conversion cycles are assumed to have more market
power, primarily as a consequence of company size. The two perspectives will be discussed
individually in the following.
2.2.1 Effects of Liquidity on Cash Conversion Cycle and
Profitability
Liquidity concerns are mentioned as an essential reason for the relationship between
profitability and net working capital (Johnson and Soenen, 2003). By minimising the
amount of capital invested in working capital, the company has more funds to invest in
profit enhancing activities. For example, it may look for inorganic growth opportunities
through M&A activity, or it may turn its focus to improving fixed assets already in place
(Papadakis, 2007). Other advantages associated with increasing liquidity are the decrease
of default risk. By releasing cash through more efficient working capital management,
companies are more resilient to external shocks in their business environment. For instance,
they are better prepared to meet their financial obligation in the event of rate hikes.
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Furthermore, the funds can be used to repay debt, and thus strengthen the balance
sheets through reduction in leverage. The notion that companies’ leverage has a significant
adverse effect on the corporate profitability has extensive support in the existing literature
(Raheman and Nasr, 2007; Arditti, 1967; Hall and Weiss, 1967). An effect of decreasing
total debt is lower financing costs, which can be explained in two ways. Intuitively,
financial expenses increase with total debt since interest expenses are a product of interest
rate and total debt. A more subtle way in which leverage affects corporate profitability
is through the relationship between capital structure and credit score. According to
previous research, the amount of debt and companies’ credit scores are negatively related.
With increasing debt, the default risk rises, and thus the credit score worsens (Ohlson,
1980; Petersen et al., 2017). Subsequently, this is likely to result in exponentially higher
marginal cost of financial debt and increase the overall cost of capital. This in turn
weakens the profitability of the companies, and also increases the alternative cost of the
capital invested in working capital.
In addition to the profitability concerns, increased liquidity could have a self-enhancing
effect on the cash conversion cycle (Saleem and Rehman, 2011). Better liquidity reduces
the counter party risk from a supplier perspective since the probability of receiving payment
for goods delivered increases. Hence, the risk of the company is negatively related with
days payables outstanding, as suppliers are more restrictive towards low-liquidity firms
due to default-risk. However, this is a trade-off between the rate of return at which the
excessive capital can be employed and the marginal return of the improvements in supplier
conditions (Saleem and Rehman, 2011).
2.2.2 How Company Size and Market Power Affect Cash
Conversion Cycle and Profitability
One of the reasons why the ideal amount of working capital varies with size can be
explained by alternative costs. In general, larger companies have an advantage relative to
small companies in obtaining external financing at lower costs (Moss and Stine, 1993).
From an alternative cost perspective, it is less costly for larger companies to finance
inventories and account receivables with debt from credit institutions (Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Berger and Udell, 1995; Shane and Cable, 2002; Cassar,
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2004). The reasoning behind this argument is that larger companies experience a positive
spread between the cost of capital in the debt market, and the marginal return on increased
inventory and account receivables (Schwartz, 1974; Deloof, 2003). Thus, an increase in
these working capital metrics up until the point where cost of capital equals the marginal
return can be argued to be economically rational. In addition, larger companies are able
to finance more of their working capital with credit as their debt capacity exceeds that of
smaller firms, and thus have a higher optimal level of working capital than smaller firms
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Consequently, we see that the positive effect of decreasing cash
conversion cycle on profitability intensifies with decreasing size (Dalci et al., 2019; Juan
García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2007).
Consistently with the argumentation above, decreasing size is associated with
decreasing debt capacity and higher financing costs (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Thus,
smaller companies are forced to use expensive capital to finance their working capital, and
will necessarily benefit more from reducing their cash conversion cycle (Faulkender and
Wang, 2006). Based on these relationships, we should expect that the length of the cash
conversion cycle increases with the size of the company, all else being equal.
However, there are significant findings of the opposite, that the cash conversion cycle
is negatively correlated with company size (Valipour et al., 2012; Nilsson, 2010; Chiou
et al., 2006). This relationship of shorter cash conversion cycles and large company size
has also been found for Norwegian companies (PWC, 2015). In fact, it is observed that
Norwegian companies in the revenue range of 100-500 mill NOK have 25% longer cash
conversion cycles, compared to companies with revenues >1000 mill NOK. The literature
argues that these differences partly rely on the market power associated with increasing
company size (Shin and Soenen, 1998). Increasing market power improves the bargaining
position of the company towards both customers and suppliers (Porter et al., 1979). Larger
companies have more leverage towards suppliers, relative to small firms, which enable them
to dictate more flexible credit terms. The more reliant a supplier is on a specific company,
the less restrictive it will be. This argument can also be extended to the customer side of
the supply chain. If a customer is reliant on a single company in order to be supplied
with vital goods, it will have to accept the tight terms and conditions of that supplier.
Consequently, more flexible credit terms increase the days payable outstanding and tighter
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customer credit policies reduce days sales outstanding, which in turn decreases the length
of the cash conversion cycle (Richards and Laughlin, 1980; Porter et al., 1979).
2.3 Longer Cash Conversion Cycle and Improved
Profitability
Although the working capital management literature for the most part supports the
conjecture that shorter cash conversion cycles increase corporate profitability, there are still
some mitigating factors that argue for the opposite. In particular, a further examination
of the individual components reveals circumstances where it could be profitable to have
longer cash conversion cycles. We will elaborate on each component separately and discuss
the instances where these contradictions may arise.
2.3.1 Days Sales Outstanding and the Motivation for Extending
Credit to Customers
There is no dispute that shortening the time it takes to collect sales outstanding
increases liquidity. On the other hand, it could also be beneficial for firms to increase
the portion of credit sales. To understand why, one has to consider the motivation for
extending credit to customers in the first place. There are costs associated with matching
the time pattern of payment of goods to the pattern of delivery of goods (Schwartz,
1974). Moreover, customers benefit from trade credit since it enables them to plan future
expenditures with greater precision and provide time to plan outlays for unexpected
purchases. Thus, companies can generate additional sales so long as the customers have
an appetite for trade credit. In addition, the literature consensus does, to a certain extent,
consider growth strategies in conjuncture with days sales outstanding. As pointed out by
Richards and Laughlin (1980), increasing account receivables deteriorate liquidity only if
the portion of credit sales to total sales increases. Therefore the effect of increasing days
sales outstanding is dependent on the costs associated with lower liquidity and the return
from strategic growth, and there could be instances where both days sales outstanding and
profitability increase together. On the other hand, there is little benefit in extending trade
credit to customers above levels dictated by the growth strategy (Nuhiu and Dërmaku,
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2017).
There are additional propositions regarding why companies actively extend customers
credit and how it can affect profitability positively. Firstly, since growth in general
is restricted to the limits of the markets, companies can increase their own profits by
financing profitable growth of their customers (Schwartz, 1974). Moreover, suppliers of
trade credit have a cost advantage over financial institutions in providing short-term
credit since they have information from transactions and can seize the goods delivered as
collateral. Hence, they can function as a financial intermediate to customers when banks
are less inclined to supply short-term financing (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Deloof and
Jegers, 1999). An additional implication is that if companies become an essential part of
their customers’ short-term financing policies by repeated transactions, they are granted
more control of their supply chain and a better bargaining position to dictate terms and
prices. Secondly, credit sales can be regarded a form of price discrimination. High margin
companies have strong willingness to make additional sales to higher costs if they can
evade cutting prices on sales to established customers. By extending trade credit with
discounts for early payments, customers with high creditworthiness will find the implied
interest rate expensive, while the low-quality lenders will find it a cheap alternative to
other short-term financing. Thus, in elastic markets the two segments effectively face
different prices, and the suppliers of trade credit achieve better market penetration and
increased profitability (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Finally, companies offer trade credit
to customers in order to signalise the quality of the goods supplied. Trade credit allows
the customers to assess the products after the purchase but before the payment, and
therefore they have the ability to withhold cash. This gives an assurance to the customers
and facilitates a process of relationship and reputation building for the suppliers, where
companies offering high-grade goods are willing to loosen their credit policies, while firms
producing low-quality goods prefer cash transactions. Moreover, small companies and
companies without other means to communicate quality are shown to have longer days
sales outstanding. However, for firms with well-established reputations for quality or
operating in homogeneous markets, the signal effect of extending trade credit only has a
confirmation effect and is therefore more limited (Long et al., 1993; Deloof and Jegers,
1996; Paul and Wilson, 2006).
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2.3.2 Days Inventory Outstanding, Stock-Outs and Barriers to
Entry
There are also some arguments to be made in direction of a longer cash conversion
cycle with regard to days inventory and profitability. An argument for why companies could
benefit from holding more inventory is based on the risk of stock-outs and its associated
consequences (Blazenko and Vandezande, 2003; Deloof, 2003). The outcome of this trade-
off depends on companies’ exposure towards stock-out risk and the preferences of their
customers. More specifically, the gains from excessive inventory are more considerable for
more concentrated industries (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986). In more crowded industries,
the consequences of stock-outs are more severe as many competitors are ready to take the
market position.
Investments in inventories can also be strategically motivated. Companies with high
market power can invest in excess production capacity in order to deter entries from other
players by threatening to lower prices. In the short run, this could imply higher inventory
levels and additional costs, but in the long run, the superior market position is sustained
(Pashigian, 1968). As these companies often have high margins, there could be instances
where inventory levels are high in conjuncture with high profits. However, empirical
research has shown that the use of excess capacity is uncommon in practice. Instead,
excess capacity seems to be present in markets where there is variability in demand and
lumpiness in investments (Lieberman, 1987).
2.3.3 Days Payables Outstanding and Early Payment discounts
Holding off invoices from suppliers can be an effective short-term source of liquidity for
firms, but it is not without risk. Firstly the suppliers will be affected by the increased costs
and over time incorporate this into their credit terms and pricing (Nuhiu and Dërmaku,
2017). Moreover, companies facing a high concentration of suppliers have to assess the
business risks and the effects on profitability of potential relationship deterioration and
weigh this against the gains of higher liquidity.
Another obscuring factor is the presence of early payment discounts. Suppliers often
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offer discounts on their goods if their customers pay by a predetermined date within the
credit period. The customers then have to balance the price reduction with the cost of
deferred payment (Paul and Wilson, 2007). The cost is the implicit interest rate incurred
when the cash discount is not taken, and this rate tends to be significantly higher than the
rate charged on working capital financing offered by financial institutions (Elliehausen and
Wolken, 1993). Moreover, companies choose to take on expensive trade credit because of
credit rationing, i.e. the unwillingness of financial institutions to provide credit because of
the borrowers’ implied risk profile. Hence, there is excess demand for short-term financing
in the markets. As mentioned previously, this demand is in turn met by suppliers of
trade credit with lower lending costs (Schwartz, 1974). Therefore, it would be likely that
companies with cheap and easy access to capital markets will take the discount, while
companies affected by credit rationing wait to the end of the term (Petersen and Rajan,
1997). Consequently, it could be that profitable companies with better creditworthiness
will seek to reduce days payables outstanding. A further point is that struggling companies
could be using liquidity from delayed payments as a life line in order to survive (Sharma
and Kumar, 2011). This relationship was also hinted at by Deloof (2003), who proposes
that less profitable Belgian firms tend to postpone payments, and additionally the same
relationship was found among Greek companies (Lazaridis and Tryfonidis, 2006).
2.4 Inherent Differences Between Public and Private
Companies and Agency Costs
The primary purpose of our thesis is to explore the differences in working capital
management between publicly listed and privately owned companies. Furthermore, we
will investigate whether agency costs originating from the structural differences between
the two ownership structures can explain these disparities. Multiple studies have focused
on how agency costs are related to different company structures. In addition, the existing
literature offers some discussions about the effect of agency costs on companies’ working
capital management. We will first discuss fundamental differences between public and
private companies. Next, we elaborate on what the literature states about the relationship
between agency costs and working capital.
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2.4.1 Inherent Differences Between Public and Private Firms
Ownership Structure
A fundamental difference between public and private companies is the ownership
structure. Firstly, the number of owners in public companies is usually substantially higher
when compared to private firms (Mueller, 2008). Secondly, individual investors of private
companies usually hold larger ownership shares in comparison with the shareholders of
public companies. A third distinction to be made between public and private companies
is that management on average has larger ownership interests in private companies
(Regjeringen, 2012). On the one hand, increasing the concentration of managerial
ownership can multiply the agency costs as the risk undertaken by the managers increases
with their ownership and influence in the company (Saunders et al., 1990; Amihud and Lev,
1981; May, 1995). The rationale for this relationship relies on the challenges for external
stakeholders associated with monitoring more risky markets, due to less transparency and
more sophisticated investment objects (Demsetz, 1983). Therefore, they have to rely on
the judgment of managers operating with a contrary risk profile.
On the other hand, we also observe the contrary, that more concentrated ownership can
have a mitigating effect on the agency problem (Jensen, 1993; Singh and Davidson III, 2003;
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). By moving towards managerial ownership, the misalignment
between owners and managements diminishes, and the agency costs decreases. A third
perspective found in the literature is that the relationship between managerial ownership
and agency costs is of a non-linear nature (Short and Keasey, 1999; McConnell and
Servaes, 1995, 1990; Morck et al., 1988). However, there is disagreement on how the effect
of managerial ownership on agency costs behaves for different ownership stakes.
Corporate Standing
Another difference between the two groups is the ability to attract and retain top
tier talent (Erdogan et al., 2016). As companies go public, they become increasingly
attractive to high level professionals. By elevating the credibility and general standing of
the company in the corporate world, it gets access to a more skilled pool of professionals
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to fill managerial positions. The quality of financial management is paramount in the
context of working capital for two reasons. Firstly, it is the executive team, led by the
CFO, which dictates and monitors the working capital policy of the company (Nuhiu and
Dërmaku, 2017). Secondly, one of their core responsibilities is to undertake investment
decisions on behalf of the company. Thus, the effect of freeing up capital through more
efficient working capital management mainly relies on the return rate at which the financial
management is able to reemploy the funds.
Reporting Practice
A third diametrical difference between Norwegian public and private firms is the
reporting practice to which these companies are obliged to adhere. While private companies
are obliged to report their financial statements on an annual basis, the public companies
must report semi-annually (Sulen, 2004; Børs, 2016). In addition to reporting on a more
frequent basis, there are particular demands for publicly listed companies regarding the
information to be included in the financial reports, as they are legally bound by the
IFRS accounting standards (Bernhoft et al., 2011). With the implementation of the
IFRS standards, publicly listed companies have become more transparent to the public,
investors and creditors (Ding et al., 2007).
In turn, the increased transparency as a result of the IFRS accounting standards is
expected to have a negative effect on the agency costs (Pae et al., 2006; Levitt, 1998). By
providing shareholders with more information on the financial state of the company on a
more frequent basis, the task of monitoring performance is made more effortless. Thus,
the management runs a higher risk by not meeting the shareholders’ expectations, as the
increased transparency enhances the reactivity of the shareholders (Bushman and Smith,
2001; Black, 2000; Huang and Zhang, 2011). A related explanation for the negative effect
of increased disclosure on agency costs is the reduction of the information asymmetry
problem through more efficient liquidity management and changed incentives (Bushee and
Leuz, 2005).
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2.4.2 Working Capital and Agency Costs
General Relationship
One link between agency costs and working capital that has substantial support
in the existing literature is that management prefers keeping capital in-house in order
to exercise control (Jensen, 1986). Management also tend to see the withholding of
cash as a safety mechanism, as keeping liquid assets in the company lowers the risk of
bankruptcy (Opler et al., 1999). Moreover, by retaining cash or investing it in working
capital, management is not exposed to the risk associated with investing these funds
externally (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Another consequence of this risk aversion amongst
managers is a more restrictive dividend policy (Drobetz et al., 2010). In addition to the
adverse effect for the shareholders, it is difficult for the capital markets to expose this
practice as these investments are funded internally (Pinkowitz, 2000). Thus, we see that
excess cash causes the management to prioritise its own interests over the interests of the
company and its respective shareholders. A mechanism for controlling the agency costs is
to increase the corporate debt in order to limit the amount of excess cash available to the
management, and subsequently the agency problem (Ang et al., 2000). However, it seems
that this relationship only holds for certain levels of debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
When companies’ leverage exceed these levels, the relationship between debt and agency
costs turns positive. Such a mechanism only changes who carries the agency problem,
as increasing corporate debt opens up for direct wealth transfers from debtholders to
shareholders (Smith Jr and Warner, 1979).
Another argument for a negative relationship between the cash conversion cycle and
agency costs is the negligence of working capital as an essential measure on financial
performance. Managers and CFOs have traditionally focused on long-term perspectives,
and thus put more effort and resources into investments with longer duration (Nuhiu and
Dërmaku, 2017). Subsequently, the management of short-term investments and working
capital has received less attention. Additionally, improvements in the cash conversion
cycle have been associated with extensive effort relative to other profit enhancing activities
(Darun, 2011). Thus, it is easy for management to prioritise less important operating
initiatives, even though the working capital issues might be more urgent.
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Chief Financial Officer
Regarding financial management, the principal executive is the CFO (Nuhiu and
Dërmaku, 2017). In addition to their monitoring function, the CFO has a direct impact
on the establishment and execution of company strategies. Moreover, the CFO has
the ultimate responsibility for investments and management of working capital. It is
natural to consider the CFO of a company, over the CEO, when investigating financial
reporting practices, as they have more influence over the companies’ financial reporting
behavior (Jiang et al., 2010). Accordingly, CFOs with skewed incentives could represent
an agency problem. One argument in favour of this notion is the effect of changing
CFO. Existing literature has found that companies appointing a new CFO experience a
significant decrease in discretionary accruals (Geiger and North, 2006). These findings
imply that new CFOs tend to take on the losses of their predecessor. Additional support
is provided by the findings of significantly higher accruals for companies hiring CFOs
directly from their auditor, as these have incentives to stay true to “their own” practice
(Menon and Williams, 2004; Dowdell and Krishnan, 2004). Current CFOs have incentives
to increase discretionary accruals as this reflects favourably on financial performance, and
subsequently on bonuses and compensation (Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Burgstahler and
Dichev, 1997; Cheng, 2004). Conversely, newly appointed CFOs are incentivised to do the
exact opposite. By reducing discretionary accruals, they set a lower bar, and thus create
larger room for improvement in the future (Geiger and North, 2006). A change of CFO is
therefore expected to lower the agency costs of the company in the short run.
2.5 Hypothesis Development
Based on the findings of existing literature in the field of working capital management,
we believe that there is a negative relationship between the cash conversion cycle of a firm,
and its profitability. The question is, however, not quite as straightforward. On the one
hand, it is possible to argue that improving the working capital management of a company
will result in increasing liquidity through freed-up funds. Increased liquidity provides the
company with financial flexibility and might have an effect on both access to external
capital and the opportunity to pursue growth strategies. On the other hand, pushing the
working capital too low will increase the company’s exposure towards other risk factors,
20 2.5 Hypothesis Development
which subsequently might have a negative impact on the financial performance overall. For
example, stock outs and strict credit sale policies may degrade the customer experience,
which subsequently materialises in decreasing sales. Also, by stretching the payables, the
company risks ruining relationships with its suppliers.
However, our expectation is that shortening the cash conversion cycle has a positive
effect on the return on invested capital due to liquidity and market power aspects. Even
though a more restrictive working capital policy is associated with higher risk, we are of
the perception that in the current state, Norwegian companies have positive marginal
return on shortening the cash conversion cycle. We also expect that companies with
relatively longer cash conversion cycles have higher marginal return on cash conversion
cycle improvements. Our first hypothesis can therefore be formulated as follows:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Decreasing the cash conversion cycle leads to an increase
in return on invested capital for Norwegian firms, with diminishing returns.
The logic behind this hypothesis is illustrated in figure 2.3 below:
Figure 2.3:
An Illustration of the Relationship between the
Cash Conversion Cycle and Return on Invested Capital
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Based on figure 1.1 in the introduction, we believe that there are consistent differences
in the cash conversion cycles of public and private companies in Norway. Subsequently,
we argue that these differences are related to the skewed exposure to agency costs. Our
perception is illustrated in the conceptual framework presented through figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4:
The Purposed Effect of Agency Costs on
the Cash Conversion Cycle
As implied by existing literature, agency costs and the cash conversion cycle are
positively related. One of the causes for this relationship is the risk aversion of company
management, as they tend to invest excessive cash in liquid assets like working capital.
In section 2.4.1 we discussed the inherent differences of public and private companies,
and how these differences can determine the amount of agency costs faced by the two
groups. On the one hand, we see a consistent negative relationship between transparent
financial reporting and agency costs. As public companies face more restrictive legislation
regarding reporting practice, we argue that public companies will have lower agency costs.
On the other hand, companies with managerial ownership seem to have lower agency
costs as the alignment of management and owner expectations is less complicated. Thus,
private companies should have an advantage relative to public companies in regard to
controlling agency problems. Nevertheless, we are of the perception that public companies
face lower agency costs due to extensive and frequent financial reporting, in addition to
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more exposure to public perception through trading at stock exchanges. Furthermore,
there are some notions that the relationship between managerial ownership and agency
costs is of a non-linear nature. Thus, our second hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Public companies have shorter cash conversion cycles
due to lower agency costs
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3 Methodology and Data
In this chapter, we will present the data and methodology used to analyse the research
question. First, we will elaborate on the data sources, sample selection and other obstacles
that we have addressed to prepare the data for further analysis. Next, we will present our
model and all the associated variables used, followed by descriptive statistics. Thirdly, we
will go more in detail on the methodology used to test our hypotheses. The last section
will explore potential issues and we will further discuss limitations to our approach.
3.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection
There are two primary sources of data. The international databank, Orbis, has been
the main source for extensive financial information on publicly listed companies in Norway,
while data on Norwegian private firms has been extracted from the Scandinavian database
Soliditet by bisnode. Where needed, we collected data from external sources in order to
construct the necessary variables for our analyses. These sources will be addressed under
the discussion of the relevant variables in section 3.2.
For both the Orbis and the Soliditet databases, we ran several queries to filter the
data. Firstly, we limited our search to fully consolidated active companies with reported
total 2018 revenue equal to or above 100 million NOK. Our motivation for the revenue
limit is to exclude smaller growth companies. Purely mathematically, these types of
companies obscure the working capital metrics we use in our models. Moreover, from an
intuitive point of view, we also regard these companies as unfit due to the uncertainty of
their future sales and thus their ability to manage working capital with stability. Next,
we sorted the companies by industries, determined by their NACE rev. 2 codes (NACE,
1990). Because of their working capital characteristics and the nature of their business
models, we have excluded companies from the following sectors: financial and insurance
activities (code 64-66), public administration and defence (code 84), education (code
85), other service activities (code 94-96), activities with households as employers (code
97-98) and activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies (code 99). The complete
list of the industry classifications is given in the table A.01 in the appendix. Lastly, we
ensured that the companies had available financial statements for each year in the period
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from 2013 to 2018. Initially, the entire process generated 1,129 eligible firms. Firm data
from 2013 was used to calculate variables of which financial items from the previous year
were required. Hence, we obtained a balanced panel data set with five years of financial
statements and 5,645 firm-years in total.
We then matched the financial statements of the two databases to ensure that the
items were comparable, removed duplicated rows and validated the data for missing and
erroneous entries. After constructing our variables (see section 3.2) the data was organised
into two subsets: Norwegian private firms and Norwegian public firms. Furthermore, the
Norwegian private data was truncated between the 5th and 95th percentiles to remove
outliers from the cash conversion cycle. Considering the relatively small size of the
Norwegian public subsample, we found it reasonable to remove outliers manually. In
order to balance the panel data, companies missing one year or more of observations after
our adjustments were completely removed from the dataset (Deloof, 2003). Finally, the
private subsample held 5375 firm years and the public subsample ended up with 270 firm
years.
3.2 Discussion of Model and Variables
In line with our first hypothesis, our models aim to explain how working capital
management affects profitability. Hence, return on invested capital is our dependent
variable, and variations of working capital management metrics are used as our explanatory
variables. Naturally, return on invested capital is influenced by factors other than working
capital management, which is reflected in our choice of control variables. The base model
for our study can therefore be presented as variations of the following regression equation:
ROIC = α + β[NWC metric] + θ[Controls] +  (3.1)
3.2.1 Dependent Variables: Return on Invested Capital
In later years, the emerging themes in the working capital literature have been the
effectiveness of working capital management and a deeper understanding of working capital
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practices (Darun et al., 2015). Effective working capital management can be summarised
by the two elements of profitability and liquidity. Our thesis revolves heavily around the
first of the two, and our dependent variable of choice is the profitability measure return
on invested capital, represented by ROIC in our models. Return on invested capital is in
effect a measure of the return yielded from all operating assets on a company´s balance
sheet (Damodaran, 2007). Therefore, it encompasses the operational and investment sides
of the business, both of which are channels that the literature believes are affected by the
working capital management. Petersen et al. (2017) argue that return on invested capital
is a better measure of operating profitability compared to nominal operating profits, such
as EBIT and NOPAT, since it takes invested capital into account and can be compared to
investors’ cost of capital. Additionally, an advantage of using return on invested capital is
that we can utilise the DuPont identity and decompose the ratio into NOPAT margin
and net operating asset turnover. This breakdown lets us study additional explanatory
variables and gives our research greater insight into how working capital management
affects the profitability of firms, and where stakeholders should direct their focus. Formally,
we follow the framework of Petersen et al. (2017), and define return on invested capital:
ROICit =
NOPATit
Invested Capitali,t−1
(3.2)
NOPAT marginit =
NOPATit
Revenuesit
(3.3)
Asset turnoverit =
Revenuesit
Invested Capitali,t−1
(3.4)
Net operating profit after tax, or NOPAT, is the profit earned on a firm’s operations
and is therefore independent of the form of financing (Petersen et al., 2017). It is derived
from earnings before interest and taxes, but adjusted for taxes paid on operating profit
solely. Since financial expenses are tax-deductible and dividends and capital gains on
qualifying shares are tax-exempt in Norway, taxes paid in the period are not applicable.
Instead, we use the corporate tax-rate in Norway times operating profit as a proxy for taxes
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paid on the operations. The proxy has its limitations due to the neglect of the effects of
deferred tax-assets, tax-liabilities and other large non-recurring tax-items. Another option
would be to use the effective tax-rate and add back the tax-shield effects from net financial
income. However, this approach would imply examination of each firm individually and is
not compatible with the time restrictions we face for this thesis. Additionally, we argue
that the effect of the various tax items excluded has a marginal implication on average.
NOPATit = EBITit(1− tt) (3.5)
In the calculation of invested capital, Petersen et al. (2017) make the distinction
between operating and financial activities, as can be seen in figure 3.1. From the liability
side of the balance sheet, invested capital is defined as the sum of net interest-bearing debt
and equity. From the asset side, invested capital equates to net operating assets, which is
equal to the sum of operating assets, less operating liabilities. The correct calculation
of invested capital requires in-depth classification of balance sheet items for each firm.
Again, this is unattainable due to our time constraints. Instead, we have followed the
methodology using a more general framework for operating assets and liabilities proposed
by Petersen et al. (2017). In this thesis, invested capital is defined as the following:
Invested Capitalit =
(Fixed Assetsi,t−1 + Current Assetsi,t−1 − Cash and Equivalentsi,t−1)
−(Current Liabilitiesi.t−1 − Short Term Interestbearing Debti,t−1)
(3.6)
In the calculations of invested capital, we use the beginning of period book value.
This simplification follows the rationale of Damodaran (2007), that investments generally
do not produce earnings within the course of the same year. Furthermore, book values are
considered closer to the nominal values invested, compared to market values that reflect
both growth and future earnings power in assets.
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Figure 3.1:
Analytical Balance Sheet
3.2.2 Independent Variables: CCC, DSO, DIO and DPO
The cycle of working capital can be managed by monitoring account receivables,
inventory, account payables and the cash balance. However, as pointed out by Nuhiu
and Dërmaku (2017), financial managers face a twofold challenge in optimising both
the monetary investment volume and the duration of these investments. This is usually
accomplished by minimising the investments in working capital and shortening the working
capital cycle. The temporal nature of the optimisation problem shows the advantage
of using flow-based liquidity metrics for working capital management, as opposed to
the absolute monetary value of working capital or working capital ratios such as the
current ratio. Richards and Laughlin (1980) raise the concern that these static indicators
fail to recognise the discrepancies between the operating cash inflows and outflows, and
give misleading views of firms’ need for short-term liquidity. Moreover, they argue that
by including income statement items to measure the turnover rates of working capital
components, managers get a better grasp on the average number of days it takes for
working capital to be converted into cash. Conversely, the view is that firms can increase
liquidity by squeezing the average turnover days. We share this conjecture of Richards
and Laughlin (1980), and in line with working capital management literature written in
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the late globalisation era, we adopt the view that the working capital effect on liquidity
and profitability is best measured by flow-based metrics (Darun et al., 2015).
3.2.2.1 Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC )
The cash conversion cycle is a measure of the net time between cash expenditures on
a firm’s productive resources and cash ultimately received from product sales (Richards
and Laughlin, 1980). It is defined as the sum of days sales outstanding and days inventory
outstanding, less days payables outstanding. Thus, it encompasses all the cash cycle
components of working capital and is effectively a comprehensive measurement of working
capital management in a firm. Gentry et al. (1990) propose a weighted cash conversion
cycle, which also takes into account the volume of funds at each step in the working
capital cycle. Although this measure fits better with the optimisation problem laid out
by Nuhiu and Dërmaku (2017), the weighted cash conversion cycle requires information
about the working capital cycle only available to internal management of the firms, and is
therefore unadoptable by external researchers. Consequently, in this thesis, we apply the
traditional cash conversion cycle.
In our models, the cash conversion cycle is represented by the variable CCC and,
contrary to similar research done on working capital and profitability, we use lagged
components when this relationship is analysed. Our main motivation for this approach is
that we believe effects from releasing net working capital generally facilitate return on
investments the following year. For instance, large companies often need to plan their
investment decisions a year ahead, and therefore assess available capital at that point in
time. Moreover, increased liquidity reduces the cost of capital for the firm due to lower
borrowing costs (Ortiz-Molina and Phillips, 2010), which in turn enable the management
to pursue new profitable investments in the future. On the other hand, we do recognise
that reductions in working capital may have income statement effects affecting return on
investments within the same year. Examples could be lower inventory management costs or
lower shrinkage costs. However, it is natural to assume that working capital initiatives are
likely to be persistent over time; hence, after adjusting for growth, the income statement
impact is also likely to be persistent in the following period. A last point in favour of using
lagged variables is that there may be issues with reversed causality. Deloof (2003) observe
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a negative relationship between days account payables and profitability in Belgian firms,
and suggest that low profitability may affect solvency and the ability to pay suppliers. By
using lagged terms, we circumvent this issue. Throughout the first part of our analysis,
we will use models with the cash conversion cycle and its components as explanatory
variables. With regard to the interpretation of the following results, we have scaled all
independent variables by 10 in the first part of our analysis. Thus, the coefficients of
the independent variables represent the effect on return on invested capital of a 10-day
change in the cash conversion cycle metrics. The scaling of the variables is applied with
the intention of improving the readability of the results presented in chapter 4.
CCCit = DSOit +DIOit −DPOit (3.7)
3.2.2.2 Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (3.7) is days sales outstanding.
Days sales outstanding is a measure of the time it takes in days to convert credit sales
into cash (Richards and Laughlin, 1980). Account receivables originate from the time gap
between sales and cash-inflow, and extension of trade credit to customers will therefore
have a direct impact on investment in working capital and days sales outstanding. Firms’
credit policies are tightly connected to strategic choices and are inherently different across
industries. Richards and Laughlin (1980) add that unless sales increase in proportion
to the increase in receivables, growth strategies will deteriorate liquidity. The effect of
increasing days sales outstanding on return on invested capital ultimately depends on the
trade-off between increased cost related to working capital and the return on strategic
growth. However, there is no benefit from extending customers’ credit above the level
dictated by the growth strategy, and management should therefore seek to minimise the
payment period to the extent that is strictly necessary (Nuhiu and Dërmaku, 2017).
Days sales outstanding is defined as net account receivables over sales in the same
period, times the number of days in a year. Net account receivables is gross accounts
receivable, less doubtful accounts, and represents the amount of credit sales the firm
estimates it can convert into cash. Dependent on the stability in doubtful accounts,
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expected credit losses will affect operating margins negatively proportionally to net
account receivables. By comparing net accounts receivables to sales in the same period,
we can estimate the degree of customer credit per unit of sales, which is the inverse of
the turnover-metric initially proposed by Richards and Laughlin (1980). The inclusion of
time makes the metric flow-based, under the assumption that receivables are converted
into cash within a year.
DSOit =
Net Account Receivablesit
Salesit
∗ 365 (3.8)
3.2.2.3 Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)
The second component in the cash conversion cycle is days inventory outstanding. It
measures the average time firms hold inventory before it is sold. Moreover, increasing the
stock of inventory also tie up more funds in investments waiting to generate returns and
prolonging the time it takes to generate cash. As with firms’ customer credit policies, the
inventory stock is also strongly connected to strategic perspectives. For instance, firms
with aggressive growth strategies may need to build the inventory stock to support future
product demand. For firms competing on quality, longer maturity periods for goods may
lift the customer experience and increase market share. Likewise, stock-outs and narrow
product ranges can affect profitability negatively (Nuhiu and Dërmaku, 2017). Although
there are situations that support higher inventory levels, large stocks are often associated
with higher storage costs and elevated management costs. The direct inventory costs
and liquidity effects must therefore be balanced against the strategic benefits in order to
maximise return on invested capital.
We define days inventory outstanding as inventory over cost of goods sold, times
the number of days in a year. Inventory is the cumulative stock of raw material, work-
in-progress and finished goods. The literature mainly scales inventories against either
sales or cost of goods sold in calculations of days inventory outstanding (Lazaridis and
Tryfonidis, 2006; Deloof, 2003). Richards and Laughlin (1980) use sales to measure the
frequency at which inventory is turned into product sales. The advantage of this view is
that changes in the turnover rate clearly depict changes in liquidity: if inventory build-up
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is higher than revenue growth, the turnover decrease and investments in working capital
increase. In turn, this leads to deterioration in liquidity. We argue, on the other hand,
that cost of goods sold is the better scale. Firstly, it is directly linked to the inventory
level on the balance sheet and therefore, by comparing the two, we obtain a more precise
estimate of the goods that are held in stock. Additionally, since cost of goods sold grows
proportionally with sales volume, the inverse of inventory divided by cost of goods sold
can be interpreted the same way as the turnover ratio laid out by Richards and Laughlin.
DIOit =
Inventoryit
Cost of Goods Soldit
∗ 365 (3.9)
3.2.2.4 Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)
The first two components of the cash conversion cycle are normally referred to as
the operating cycle of a business. The operating cycle alone is, however, deficient as a
cash flow measure because it neglects the timing of cash outflows imposed on firms by
their suppliers (Richards and Laughlin, 1980). The cash conversion cycle addresses this
issue by subtracting days payables outstanding, the average number of days it takes the
firm to pay its suppliers. When firms defer payments to suppliers, they effectively obtain
short-term financing, which increases liquidity and can be used to invest in profitable
projects (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). In practice, increasing days payables is easily
achieved by holding off invoices until they are overdue. Although this may be effective in
the short run, the long-term effect of such practice may be that suppliers will consider
the additional costs in their terms and pricing (Nuhiu and Dërmaku, 2017). Moreover,
increasing days payables outstanding may not be the optimal strategy in the presence
of payment discounts. For firms with easy access to liquidity, the cost of capital must
be compared to the implicit borrowing cost from not taking the discount (Deloof, 2003;
Paul and Wilson, 2007). In order to optimise days payables outstanding, companies
must weigh the return on payables against the alternative cost of product discounts and
supplier relationship degradation. Since we are analysing this operational point of view,
as opposed to the financing perspective, we find days payables outstanding superior to net
account payables over total assets (Deloof and Jegers, 1996). Days payables outstanding
is calculated by dividing account payables by cost of goods sold, before multiplying the
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ratio with the number of days in a year to make the measure flow-based and comparable
to the other components of the cash conversion cycle.
DPOit =
Account Payablesit
Cost of Goods Soldit
∗ 365 (3.10)
3.2.2.5 Asset Turnover and Cost Ratio as Proxies for Agency Costs
We have applied two proxies for agency costs in the last part of our analysis, namely
Asset Turnover and Cost Ratio. According to Ebben and Johnson (2011), asset turnover
works as a proxy for quality of the management in regard to its ability to employ freed-up
capital. Moreover, since asset turnover describes the utilisation of assets, it effectively
becomes an inverse measure of agency costs, where low turnover may indicate inadequate
investment decisions (Florackis and Ozkan, 2004). In our analysis, we have applied the
following calculation for asset turnover:
Asset Turnoverit =
Total Revenuesit
Total Assetsi,t−1
(3.11)
The Operating Expense Ratio, represented by Cost Ratio, describes the degree to
which management spends on itself relative to revenues. For instance, excessive numbers
of managers, unnecessary perks for the management group, excessive numbers of offices
etc. raise the SGA cost and the operating expense ratio. All else being equal, higher ratios
yield lower returns on invested capital, and are therefore a proper measure of agency costs
(Ang et al., 2000). In the next sections, we have adopted this definition of the operating
expense ratio:
Cost Ratioit =
[Total Revenue− EBIT − COGS]it
Total Revenueit
(3.12)
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3.2.3 Control Variables
This section will elaborate on all the control variables in our models. We have focused
on well-established effects found in previous work, and we expand upon the literature
where improvements have been suggested.
3.2.3.1 Year-over-year growth (Growth)
The first company characteristic we control for is the year-over-year growth. We
believe that growth is a determinant of profitability, and is also an important factor to
consider for management when making working capital decisions (Schwartz, 1974). It
is therefore reasonable to control for this variable in order to better isolate the effect of
working capital management. The inclusion of a growth control does also have support in
the literature (Deloof, 2003). The variable is calculated as the annual sales in period t
divided by the annual sales in period t-1, less 1.
3.2.3.2 Size (Size)
This variable is used to control for the size of the companies. In the Literature
Review, we have emphasised the effect of company size on corporate profitability. Studies
conducted on the relationship have consistently proven that this relationship is of a positive
nature (John and Adebayo, 2013; Papadogonas, 2006; Halil and Hasan, 2012). Thus, we
will control for size, computed as the natural logarithm of the annual revenues of firm i in
year t. The motivation for log transforming the Size variable is to adjust for the skewed
distribution of this variable. Through a logarithmic transformation, we make the data
more normalised. Furthermore, as all of our dependent variables are on level-form, the
coefficient of the Size variable can be interpreted as follows: When increasing size by 1%,
the independent variable will increase by θSize/100 units.
3.2.3.3 Probability of Default (Prb. Def.)
In addition to Size and Growth, we have controlled for the financial health with
the companies’ credit score denominated as the probability of default. We are of the
perception that the financial health of a company will have an impact on the profitability,
and thus see it necessary to control for this effect. This view is supported by several
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studies which have found that the financial position of a company is a strong determinant
of the ability to generate profits (Shin and Soenen, 1998; Mathuva, 2015). The calculation
of the variable is based on the Olson O-score, which ultimately decides the probability
of a company defaulting on their debt obligations within a 12-month period with a logit
regression (Ohlson, 1980).
The formula used to calculate the O-score is displayed below:
yi = −1.32− 0.47[SIZE] + 6.03[TLTA]− 1.43[WCTA] + 0.0757[CLCA]− 2.37[NITA]
−1.83[FUTL] + 0.285[INTWO]− 1.72[OENEG]− 0.521[CHIN ]
(3.13)
Where the probability of default is calculated as:
P = 1 + exp(−yi)−1 (3.14)
Ohlson (1980) defines the variables as follows: SIZE is the logarithm of the company’s
total assets divided by Norwegian CPI, and TLTA is total liabilities over total assets.
WCTA is working capital divided by total assets, and current liabilities over current assets
is expressed by CLCA. Furthermore, NITA is net income scaled by total assets, while
FUTL portray funds provided by operations divided by total liabilities. INTWO is a
binary variable, which takes the value one if net income has been negative for the last
two years, and 0 otherwise. The last two variables are OENEG and CHIN. OENEG is
another binary variable, where one implies that total liabilities exceeds total assets, and
zero implies the opposite. Finally, CHIN is the year-over-year change in net income.
3.2.3.4 Leverage (Leverage)
Based on standard corporate finance theory, there is also reason to believe that the
capital structure of companies will have an impact on the corporate profitability. Even
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though the results of Modigliani and Miller (1958) imply the opposite, more recent research
has proven that the presence of financial frictions causes a negative effect of corporate
debt on profitability. Increasing amounts of debt elevate the debt handling cost, and thus
draw focus and resources away from profit generating activities (Krugman, 1988). In
our models, we have used the debt ratio as a proxy on company leverage. The proxy is
calculated as the long-term financial debt in year t divided by total assets in the same
period. This is similar to the approach of Deloof (2003), who also include the Leverage
control in his analyses.
3.2.3.5 Financial Asset Ratio (FA Ratio)
According to Petersen et al. (2017), the financial asset ratio can be considered as
a measure of long-term liquidity position of companies. The ratio indicates the relative
amount of assets which over time can be liquidated without affecting the operations.
Furthermore it is viewed as a liquidity buffer in the case of sustained period of losses. The
financial asset ratio can thus be seen as a proxy for long-term solvency of companies, and
is hence used to control for the effect of operational stability on profitability. The ratio is
calculated as the sum of fixed financial assets divided by total assets.
3.2.3.6 Cash Ratio (Cash)
Companies with a positive return on invested capital benefit more from reemploying
the cash than keeping it idle, and it is therefore necessary to control for companies’ ability
to re-invest funds. Results of studies conducted by Faulkender and Wang (2006) indicate
that the market value of withheld cash diminishes with the level of cash. The view is that
investors reward companies for increased liquidity up to a given point until they no longer
believe management can reinvest capital to an acceptable rate of return. With regard to
working capital management, this implies that initiatives to free up capital are likely to
have a decreasing marginal effect with the size of the existing cash balance. To obtain
a clear picture of the effects of working capital management on profitability, this effect
is accounted for in our models with the variable Cash and is defined as cash and cash
equivalent scaled by total assets.
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3.3 Methodology
This section will introduce the econometric techniques applied in order to investigate
the various aspects of the research question. For all of our models, we apply panel data
regressions. Analogous to similar research conducted by Deloof (2003), we incorporate
firm fixed effects to estimate the impact of working capital management on return on
invested capital. For a company, there are numerous determinants of financial profitability,
and over the course of five years it is believed that many of these unknown factors
will be constant. Furthermore, it is also highly likely that some of these variables are
unobservable and may induce endogeneity through omitted variable bias. An advantage
of firm fixed effects is that every company are assigned with their own intercept that
absorbs these variables. Ultimately, we are left with the average effect working capital
management within firms. Fixed effect estimation also has its restriction in that any
relationship of interest determined by a time-invariable factor will be completely wiped out
of the model. For instance, the model cannot estimate industry intercepts. Additionally,
to remove correlation between observations constant over a year, we include year-fixed
effects in our regression models (Petersen, 2009). We are then left with a two-way within
fixed effects model to describe the effects of working capital management. To adjust for
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity within firm-clusters, we include robust standard
errors in accordance to the White method. Moreover, Petersen (2009) suggests that when
the number of firms is larger than the number of years in the panel set, standard errors
clustered by firms are unbiased. We therefore adopt this methodology in our regression
models.
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3.3.1 Cash Conversion Cycle and Return on Invested Capital
(H1)
To analyse how the cash conversion cycle and its components affect return on invested
capital, we have constructed the following model, which also serves as the base model in
this thesis:
Rit = α + βWi,t + θn
∑
n
Xit + γt
∑
t
Yt + δi
∑
i
Ci + it (3.15)
where Rit is return on invested capital, the profitability measure is presented in
section 3.2.1, for firm i in year t. The various working capital management measures,
i.e. independent variables, are represented by variable Wit, based on which component of
the cash conversion cycle is analysed. As mentioned in section 3.2.2, these variables are
lagged one year in order to circumvent the problems related to reversed causality proposed
by Deloof (2003). Hence, return on invested capital in period t is regressed on working
capital metrics in period t - 1. In models containing time-variable firm specific controls,
the vector Xit represents all the previously defined variables. The control variable in
question is identified by n, which run from 1 to 6. In addition, vectors Ci and Yt contain
the firm and time fixed effects, respectively. Finally, it, is the error term for company i
in period t.
In Hypothesis 1, we regress ROIC on CCC, DSO, DIO and DPO in order to identify
the effects of working capital management on profitability for the entire sample. In that
regard, β is the coefficient of interest. In the first part of this sub-analysis, we first
estimate a model with firm and year fixed effects, but without the inclusion of control
variables. Further, we add the controls to uncover the impact these may have on ROIC
and on the coefficients on the working capital management variables. In the second part
of the analysis of Hypothesis 1, we apply the last model of the first part, but on different
subsamples. We categorise the companies into quartiles based on their average working
capital management efficiency over the past five years. We treat the metrics separately,
and therefore a company may appear in different quartiles for the different measures. By
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splitting the companies in quartiles, we aim to explore marginal effects of efficient working
capital management in the various performance brackets, and for each metric individually.
3.3.2 Public versus Private and the Effect of Agency Costs (H2)
In Hypothesis 2, we look at the differences seen in the data between public and
private companies concerning their working capital management. Furthermore, we explore
whether the difference displayed in the descriptive statistics can be proven statistically
significant. The question is analysed by using differences in means, where we look at
the five-year averages for the working capital metrics. The procedure is accordance with
Welch’s t-test for unequal variances. In addition, the test is preferable to the student’s
t-test since the public company subsample is significantly smaller than that of private,
and smaller samples are associated with higher variance (Derrick et al., 2016). Another
complication of the differences in sample sizes is that firm-specific characteristics have
greater impact on the mean in the smaller public subsample. For instance, a substantial
amount of companies in a high inventory sector could obscure the inference from a
two-sample t-test. To address this issue, we have regressed the working capital metrics
on the control variables in panel data models with fixed firm and time effects for each
sample. Subsequently, the fitted values from the regressions were used in the t-tests. The
t-statistics accordingly describe the differences in means, given exogenous determinants of
working capital management.
Following the comparison of means in the working capital measures, Hypothesis 2
will try to examine whether the discrepancy can be attributed to differences in return to
efficient working capital management and indirectly to identify the presence of differences
in agency costs between the two groups. Hence, we apply the base model described in
3.3.1, with incorporation of interaction terms to describe whether the company is public
or private. The variable Public takes the value of one if the company is publicly listed
and zero otherwise. The variables CCC, DSO, DIO and DPO are interacted with Public
to describe the additional effect of working capital management on ROIC for publicly
listed firms, and the coefficients on these variables are therefore the estimates of interest.
Next, we analyse the direct relationship between agency costs and working capital
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management. In this section we use panel data regression models where we regress the
different working capital management variables on the two proxies for agency costs Asset
Turnover and Cost Ratio. The models also include control variables and fixed firm and
year effects. These are acknowledged in the literature as viable proxies for agency costs
(Ang et al., 2000; Florackis and Ozkan, 2004), but we are reluctant to rely solely upon
analysis of these variables, as they could be perceived “noisy” for our purposes. Primarily,
we are afraid of the close link between the calculation of the working capital variables
and the agency proxies may induce an endogeneity problem in our models. In particular,
the relationship between the balance sheet items used in the calculations of the working
capital variables and total assets used in the denominator of Asset Turnover may create
complications.
In the last part of the analysis, we try to measure the effects of agency costs on
working capital management in a more exogenous manner. The conjecture laid out in
Hypothesis 2 is that different management incentives between public and private firms
may explain the difference in working capital policies. This is tested in form of two
quasi-experiments, where we look at the effects of deregulation of reporting rules at the
Oslo Stock Exchange, and replacement of CFOs among public companies in the analysis
period. We believe the deregulation serves as an exogenous shock on agency costs because
publicly listed companies from 2017 were only required to report IFRS financial statements
on a semi-annually basis, as opposed to quarterly. Consequently, the reduced transparency
suffered by external stakeholders decreases monitoring and raises agency costs in these
firms (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Black, 2000; Huang and Zhang, 2011). The event is
therefore expected to have a negative impact on agency costs and, in turn, working capital
management. In other words, we would expect to observe longer cash conversion cycles for
public companies from 2017. However, we could question to what extent the deregulation
of reporting rules actually would affect the working capital practice of companies as the
impact on transparency is somewhat limited. These companies still report according
to the IFRS standards semi-annually, and some companies have continued with their
quarterly reporting practice.
The second shock applied is believed to have a positive outcome on the cash conversion
cycle. Replacement of CFO represents an exogenous shock that reduces agency costs, and
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is a well-described phenomenon in the literature (Geiger and North, 2006; Burgstahler and
Dichev, 1997; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Cheng, 2004). Previous research has found that
discretionary accruals are significantly reduced when a new CFO is appointed. Moreover,
the authors all argue that this is due to diverging incentives for the former and the
new CFO. We believe that the change of CFO is fairly exogenous, at least in the short
run, although we recognise that the replacement of the CFO may affect other aspects
of financial performance and therefore be interlinked with working capital investments
through these.
In order to analyse the impact of deregulation of reporting rules for companies listed
on the Oslo Stock Exchange, we follow the procedure of Wooldridge (2007) for Difference-
in-Difference estimation with panel data of more than two periods. In this context, public
companies are the treated group and the treatment effect is observed from 2017, which is
defined as the post-period. Hence, the pre-period is all years before 2017. The implied
assumption is that the effect of the deregulation is constant in the post-period. Private
companies were not subject to the same changes in reporting practices, and they will
therefore serve as the control group. This has the advantage of letting us use the full
sample of observations. The Difference-in-Difference estimator, referred to as DiD, is the
product of Public and Post binary variables, which estimate the additional slope on the
regression line for public companies in the post period. This slope is the coefficient τ in
the following model:
Wit = α + φPi+ ωTt + τDiDit + θn
∑
n
Xit + γt
∑
t
Yt + δi
∑
i
Ci + it (3.16)
whereWit is the working capital metric, Pi is the binary indicator for public companies,
Tt is the binary variable signifying the post-period of the treatment and the other terms
are equivalent to the base model. In an estimation of Difference-in-Difference with panel
data regression models the treatment variable, Pi, and the post-treatment period variable,
Tt, will be absorbed in firm and year fixed effects. Therefore, the estimated model is
reduced to:
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Wit = τDiDit + θn
∑
n
Xit + γt
∑
t
Yt + δi
∑
i
Ci + it (3.17)
The framework of Differences-in-Differences-in-Difference (DDD) is adopted to
estimate the effects of replacing the CFO in public companies. Naturally, the change
of CFO is the treatment and the treated group are the public companies that replaced
their CFO in the period of 2014 to 2018. In addition, we have two control groups: public
and private companies without CFO intervention. The inclusion of another control group
separates the DDD from a simple Difference-in-Difference (Wooldridge, 2007). Since we
have panel data and arbitrary treatment patterns as well, the procedure is also slightly
more complicated. We have gathered information on CFO status for 66 public and private
companies in our original data set, and then constructed the variables New CFO and
Post. They are both binary indicators, and the former is unity when a company has
replaced its CFO in the period and indicates the treatment group, while the latter is
unity for the particular year of the replacement and for every succeeding year in the time
span. This imposes the assumption that the effect from the shock on agency costs is
constant for each year after the event. Moreover, the product of the two new variables,
and the Public binary variable, is defined as a new variable, DDDit. The DDD-estimator
is given by the coefficient on this variable, τ , from the model below. Additionally, we
have defined pre- and post-treatment periods for the companies in the control groups.
The segregation point between the two intervals was chosen to be 2016, calculated as
the median year the public companies replaced their CFO. In the following regression
model, the working capital metric, Wit, is regressed on DDDit, and the aforementioned
control variables. It also includes fixed firm and time effects given by the vectors Yt and
Ci. Moreover, as for the Difference-in-Difference regression model, including fixed effects
will absorb constants and interaction terms perfectly collinear with the fixed effects. Due
to the variation in treatment pattern for each company, the Post binary variable and
its interaction with Public are both variable across firms and time and will therefore be
included in the estimated model. They are indicated by the variables Tt and PiTt in the
equation, where Tt is Post binary variable and Pi is the Public indicator. The constant
group identification variables Public and NewCFO and the interactions between both the
two of them, will be wiped out of the regression. This is also the case for the interaction
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between NewCFO and Post. Finally, the model becomes:
Wit = α + ωTt ++λPiTt + τDDDit + θn
∑
n
Xit + γt
∑
t
Yt + δi
∑
i
Ci + it (3.18)
3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
In this last section of the chapter, we will discuss the descriptive statistics of all
variables used in our analyses. Since we use panel data, we will first look at each cross-
section in each time period and look for trends or abnormalities. Then we will examine
the sample as a whole, in a pooled cross section.
In table 3.1 and figure 3.2 below, we show ROIC and the explanatory variables CCC,
DSO, DIO and DPO, for each year in the time period 2014 to 2018. The independent
variables are lagged and therefore display the working capital days one year before the
dependent variable. Furthermore, the independent variables are scaled so that they
correspond to 10 working capital days.
Table 3.1:
Sample Distribution
The table displays the dependent variable ROIC and the independent variables CCC, DSO,
DIO and DPO over the period 2014 to 2018. The independent variables are lagged by
one year and scaled to represent 10 days. Each variable is the average in the aggregated
sample of both public and private companies in Norway. N signifies the number of
observations per year, and is constant throughout the period describing a balanced panel set.
Year N ROIC CCC DSO DIO DPO
2014 1129 0.126 6.98 5.75 7.19 5.96
2015 1129 0.119 7.08 5.73 6.95 5.61
2016 1129 0.121 7.29 5.63 7.11 5.45
2017 1129 0.121 7.30 5.88 7.15 5.66
2018 1129 0.112 7.33 5.97 7.41 6.05
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An interesting observation is that CCC is fairly stable with a positive drift over the
five-year time span, while ROIC is more volatile, with a negative trend. In general, these
trends are supportive of Hypothesis 1, but the higher volatility of ROIC indicates other
underlying determinant factors as well. In particular, the drop in profitability in 2015
could be explained by the drop in oil prices in 2014 and its repercussions for the Norwegian
economy. Further visual inspection displays indications of covariance between DSO and
DPO, suggesting Norwegian companies have had their focus toward squeezing suppliers
for extra liquidity and loosening their terms to customers. DIO also show an interesting
pattern; it falls in 2015 and steadily increases thereafter. This could hypothetically also
be seen in conjunction with to the oil crisis.
Figure 3.2:
WCM and ROIC Throughout the Period 2014 to 2018
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In table 3.2, the sample is portrayed as agglomerated. The descriptive statistics also
include the control variables used in the regression models. Over the period, the average
ROIC in the sample is 12%, which is close to the gross operating income measure of
Deloof (2003) and net operating profit ratio used by Raheman and Nasr (2007), of 12.2%
and 11.5% respectively. Although not completely comparable to our operational profitably
measure, due to the inclusion of additional operating costs and different balance sheet
scaling, it is an indication that our sample acts in accordance with previous research. We
do, however, have almost twice the variability in this metric. Looking at the minimum and
maximum values, this may be explained by inclusion of more extreme values. Whereas
Deloof (2003) operates with bounds of -0.271 to 0.721, we allow for more variation among
companies. In our data, these types of observations are related to companies with huge
variability in returns from one year to the next, indicating lumpy investments with long
horizons. We argue that this is a natural operating cycle for many Norwegian companies
and therefore this variability should be included in our analysis. Similarly, we observe
a year-over-year growth rates well above that seen in previous studies (Deloof, 2003;
Ebben and Johnson, 2011). In addition to irregular investment patterns, our sample
shows instances of high growth rates early in the period before stabilising towards the
end. Hence, we are able to capture aspects of strategic growth during the period. It
is important to underline that we are looking at companies in a different country and
over a different period from the current literature and that deviations should therefore be
expected. CCC and its components are fairly in line with those of similar studies (Deloof,
2003; Lazaridis and Tryfonidis, 2006). The aggregated sample show an average CCC of
59.9 days, taking our 10-day scaling into account, and is well in the 44.8 to 189.0 range
postulated by previous analyses. Furthermore, the components DSO, DIO and DPO are
all very close to the means found in Belgian firms by Deloof (2003).
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Table 3.2:
Descriptive Statistics for the Sample Aggregated
The table portrays descriptive statistics for each cross-section pooled, including both public and
private companies. In total, the sample consists of 1,129 companies and 5,645 firm-years in a balanced
panel data set over the period from 2014 to 2018. The dependent variable ROIC is calculated as
EBIT adjusted for tax, divided by invested capital. The working capital management variables
are lagged by one year and scaled to represent 10 days outstanding. CCC is defined as the sum
of DSO and DIO, less DPO. DSO is account receivables to sales, multiplied by 365 days in a
year. DIO is inventory as a ratio of cost of goods sold, times 365. Likewise, DPO is calculated
as the ratio of account payables to cost of goods sold, multiplied by 365. Moreover, Growth is the
year-over-year growth in total revenues and Size is the natural logarithm of total revenues. Prb.
Def. represents the probability bankruptcy within one year based on Ohlson’s o-score. Leverage
is interest-bearing long-term debt over total assets. Further, FA Ratio is fixed financial assets
divided by total assets. Lastly, Cash is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets.
Quantiles
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. p25 Median p75 Max.
Profitability Variable
ROIC 5645 0.120 0.277 -2.433 0.034 0.084 0.170 3.186
WCM Variables
CCC 5645 7.195 8.370 -124.989 2.358 5.990 11.131 85.644
DSO 5645 5.776 3.760 0.000 3.184 5.258 7.502 53.368
DIO 5645 7.164 7.700 0.000 1.033 4.937 10.716 70.082
DPO 5645 5.745 5.640 0.000 2.893 4.926 7.430 151.994
Agency Cost Proxies
Asset Ratio 5645 1.584 1.123 0.021 0.870 1.410 2.044 16.956
Cost Ratio 5645 0.429 0.238 -0.267 0.245 0.392 0.570 4.212
Control Variables
Growth 5645 0.113 1.300 -0.862 -0.023 0.057 0.154 81.446
Size 5645 12.900 1.290 9.468 11.945 12.509 13.427 20.355
Prb. Def. 5645 0.265 0.239 0.000 0.066 0.190 0.190 1.000
Leverage 5645 0.242 0.207 0.000 0.066 0.202 0.375 1.615
FA Ratio 5645 0.061 0.103 0.000 0.038 0.022 0.072 0.935
Cash 5645 0.135 0.126 0.000 0.004 0.094 0.194 0.824
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Table 3.3 provides the first indications of differences in working capital management
between public and private firms. Firstly, we observe that private companies have an
average CCC almost 26 days longer than that of public firms. Looking further into the
details, the table displays large deviations between inventory days and payable days.
Public companies have 43 days and 65 days longer DIO and DPO, respectively. On the
other hand, it takes private companies 4 days longer to collect receivables. The visual
representation is displayed by figure 3.3. Overall, the descriptive statistics show that
public companies are more efficient at managing both their customers and suppliers, and
hold inventory to a greater extent. Of course, these statistics do not take firm specific
characteristics into account, such as industry and growth. In the comparison between the
two sub-sets we address this, and we refer to section 3.3 for the procedure and section
4.2.3 for the results.
Figure 3.3:
Breakdown of Working Capital Discrepancy
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Table 3.3:
Descriptive Statistics for the Private and Public Subsamples
The table displays observations, means, standard deviations and distributions for private and public companies, separately. Each subsample consists of pooled
cross-sections in the 2014-2018 time span. The dependent variable ROIC is calculated as EBIT adjusted for tax, divided by invested capital. The working capital
management variables are lagged by one year and scaled to represent 10 days outstanding. CCC is defined as the sum of DSO and DIO, less DPO. DSO is
account receivables to sales, multiplied by 365 days in a year. DIO is inventory as a ratio of cost of goods sold, times 365. Likewise, DPO is calculated as the
ratio of account payables to cost of goods sold, multiplied by 365. Moreover, Growth is the year-over-year growth in total revenues and Size is the natural
logarithm of total revenues. Prb. Def. represents the probability bankruptcy within one year based on Ohlson’s o-score. Leverage is interest-bearing long-term
debt over total assets. Further, FA Ratio is fixed financial assets divided by total assets. Lastly, Cash is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets.
Private Companies Public Companies
Quartiles Quartiles
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. p25 Median p75 Max. N Mean Std. Dev. Min. p25 Median p75 Max.
Profitability Variable
ROIC 5375 0.122 0.279 -2.433 0.035 0.085 0.173 2.393 270 0.075 0.236 -0.757 0.011 0.072 0.126 3.186
WCM Variables
CCC 5375 7.317 7.566 -15.293 2.422 6.018 11.180 35.669 270 4.767 17.939 -124.989 -0.274 4.443 10.580 85.644
DSO 5375 5.794 3.731 0.000 3.166 5.282 7.567 40.344 270 5.422 4.208 0.000 3.554 4.810 6.300 53.368
DIO 5375 6.957 7.258 0.000 0.999 4.828 10.558 45.020 270 11.282 13.137 0.000 2.024 8.441 13.775 70.082
DPO 5375 5.434 4.181 0.000 2.793 4.792 7.257 53.591 270 11.937 16.700 0.589 5.621 7.460 10.930 151.994
Control Variables
Growth 5375 0.096 0.722 -0.862 -0.023 0.057 0.154 49.019 270 0.461 5.000 -0.704 -0.024 0.064 0.150 81.446
Size 5375 12.740 1.123 10.296 11.927 12.460 13.277 18.291 270 15.315 1.825 9.468 14.040 15.414 16.480 20.355
Prb. Def. 5375 0.272 0.240 0.000 0.072 0.120 0.420 1.000 270 0.130 0.182 0.001 0.020 0.060 0.165 0.927
Leverage 5375 0.243 0.209 0.000 0.065 0.204 0.378 1.615 270 0.209 0.169 0.000 0.184 0.184 0.296 0.985
FA Ratio 5375 0.061 0.102 0.000 0.004 0.022 0.073 0.935 270 0.061 0.112 0.000 0.001 0.021 0.066 0.630
Cash 5375 0.137 0.128 0.000 0.038 0.096 0.198 0.824 270 0.091 0.072 0.000 0.041 0.073 0.114 0.412
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4 Results and Discussion
In this chapter, we will first present the Pearson’s correlations between all variables
used in our analysis, before we focus on the results from our analyses of Hypothesis 1
and Hypothesis 2. In Hypothesis 1, we apply multivariate regression models to test the
relationship between the cash conversion cycle and profitability in Norwegian companies.
Furthermore, Hypothesis 2 is analysed with two variations of the Difference-in-Difference
methodology, and we seek to find the impact of agency costs on the differences in working
capital policies between public and private firms.
4.1 Pearson’s Correlations
Before we analyse the hypotheses, we will elaborate on the Pearson’s coefficients
between all variables incorporated in our multivariate regression models, and discuss
potential interventions with our analyses. The correlation coefficients are presented in
table 4.1.
A general observation derived from the table is the low magnitude of the Pearson’s
correlation coefficients. The likelihood of a multicollinarity issue among the variables
is therefore limited. There is no unanimous threshold for the Pearson’s correlation in
relation to multicollinarity, but correlations below 0.5 are generally considered to be low.
Notable exceptions are CCC and the correlation with its components. These correlations
are to be expected since CCC is an additive function of DSO, DIO and DPO, see section
3.2 for further elaboration. Additionally, the working capital metrics are never included
together within the same model, so this is of little concern. Furthermore, results from
VIF-tests are well below critical levels and we are confident that multicollinearity will
not tamper with the standard deviations of our regression models and interfere with the
interpretation of the coefficients.
Pearson’s correlations do not allow for controls in relationships, and given that the
working capital management is a minor determinant of return on invested capital, we
do not expect to see a large correlation between the independent variables and ROIC.
The correlation matrix show a positive relationship between CCC and ROIC. Although
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contrary to our expectations, the correlation coefficient is close to zero and without further
controls it would be unlikely that we will find a large impact of CCC on ROIC. The
correlation between DSO and ROIC shows promise; even though the magnitude of the
coefficient is minor, the sign of the coefficient is in line with Hypothesis 1. Similarly,
one can observe a small negative correlation between ROIC and DIO. Contrary to the
coefficient displayed, we would expect a positive relationship between DPO and ROIC.
However, similar correlations were found by Deloof (2003), and it could be indicative of
companies exploiting cash discounts or being affected by credit rationing, as discussed in
the literature review.
In terms of the control variables, Growth has a relatively high correlation with the
return on invested capital. This is an expected relationship, as companies with persistently
high return on invested capital are thought to have better conditions for profitable growth.
Other control variables with relatively high correlation with return on invested capital are
Leverage and Prb. Def., with the correlations of -0.155 and -0.233 respectively. Probability
of default can be considered a synthetic credit score used to assess financial health. Higher
probabilities therefore imply liquidity positions where companies are struggling to meet
their financial debt obligations and have a greater risk of bankruptcy. Hence, the negative
correlation can be explained by the problem of overhanging debt since the access to
capital is limited and management is unable to pursue value-adding projects (Krugman,
1988). Considering Leverage, the negative correlation is slightly less intuitive. The renown
Modigliani Miller theorem states that the value of a firm is independent of its capital
structure, and therefore we should expect the operational performance to be unaffected by
leverage (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). However, in capital markets with financial frictions
such as taxes and bankruptcy costs, the cost of capital exhibits a convex relationship to
the leverage ratio. Therefore, the correlation could be explained by increased bankruptcy
costs which raise the cost of capital and make otherwise profitable investments unfeasible.
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Table 4.1:
Correlation Matrix
The correlation matrix shows Pearson’s correlations for all the variables used in the forthcoming analyses. The dependent variable ROIC is calculated
as EBIT adjusted for tax, divided by invested capital. The working capital management variables are scaled by scaled to represent 10 days outstanding,
and one-year lags are also included. CCC is defined as the sum of DSO and DIO, less DPO. DSO is account receivables to sales, multiplied by 365
days in a year. DIO is inventory as a ratio of cost of goods sold, times 365. Likewise, DPO is calculated as the ratio of account payables to cost
of goods sold, multiplied by 365. Moreover, Growth is the year-over-year growth in total revenues and Size is the natural logarithm of total revenues.
Prb. Def. represents the probability bankruptcy within one year based on Ohlson’s o-score. Leverage is interest-bearing long-term debt over total
assets. Further, FA Ratio is fixed financial assets divided by total assets. Lastly, Cash is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets.
ROIC CCC DSO DIO DPO CCCt−1 DSOt−1 DIOt−1 DPOt−1 Asset Turnover Cost Ratio Growth Size Prb. Def. Leverage FA Ratio Cash
ROIC 1
CCC 0.028 1
DSO 0.005 0.247 1
DIO 0.014 0.747 -0.082 1
DPO -0.021 -0.327 0.181 0.229 1
CCCt−1 0.001 0.798 0.134 0.621 -0.269 1
DSOt−1 -0.017 0.120 0.704 -0.118 0.124 0.228 1
DIOt−1 -0.001 0.619 -0.116 0.848 0.187 0.712 -0.095 1
DPOt−1 -0.014 -0.261 0.112 0.156 0.736 -0.361 0.197 0.244 1
Asset Turnover 0.078 -0.162 -0.251 -0.164 -0.159 -0.153 -0.220 -0.152 -0.127 1
Cost Ratio -0.121 -0.125 0.140 -0.029 0.256 -0.139 0.121 -0.045 0.225 -0.282 1
Growth 0.137 0.086 0.137 0.065 0.055 -0.004 0.063 -0.003 0.043 0.006 0.024 1
Size -0.025 -0.052 -0.036 0.016 0.083 -0.036 -0.025 0.031 0.079 -0.006 -0.083 -0.017 1
Prb. Def. -0.233 -0.155 -0.042 -0.108 0.061 -0.164 -0.047 -0.122 0.045 0.287 0.145 -0.008 -0.240 1
Leverage -0.155 -0.079 -0.035 -0.066 0.005 -0.093 -0.036 -0.077 0.010 -0.373 0.227 -0.013 -0.040 0.349 1
FA Ratio -0.035 -0.039 -0.010 -0.072 -0.052 -0.027 0.001 -0.069 -0.053 -0.142 -0.023 -0.007 0.063 -0.153 -0.030 1
Cash 0.138 -0.115 -0.075 -0.116 -0.039 -0.094 -0.022 -0.111 -0.027 0.087 0.043 0.014 -0.206 -0.242 -0.366 -0.084 1
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4.2 Main Results
In this section of the chapter, we will direct our focus towards the Hypotheses 1 and
2. We will first have a general discussion of repeated results exhibited from the similar
regression models applied in both hypotheses, before we explore the findings related to
each hypothesis separately.
4.2.1 General Discussion of the Base Regression Model
The succeeding six regression tables are based on the base model presented in section
3.3, thus they follow the same structure but with some variations to the samples and
specifications, which will be addressed upon the discussion of each model. They all include
the six control variables presented in section 3.2, in addition to the incorporation of firm
and year fixed effects.
With a few exceptions, Growth has a statistically significant coefficient in the range of
0.032 to 0.168 throughout the analysis. We believe there is a close interlink between growth
and return on invested capital as more profitable companies will have a compounding
effect on their growth under the assumption that management teams are consistently able
to identify new profit-generating ventures. However, the coefficient is rather small, and the
economical relevance is questionable. With a revenue growth of 10%, companies experience
a ∼ 0.3 percentage point increase in return on invested capital. Furthermore, in the broad
majority of our models, the Size control variable shows positive coefficients in the range
of 0.060 to 0.145 at a 1% significance level. This result is in accordance with existing
literature as size is considered an important determinant of company profitability (Hall
and Weiss, 1967; Deloof, 2003; Lazaridis and Tryfonidis, 2006). The economies of scale in
production drive production costs down, and allow companies to offer a broader range of
products. Moreover, larger companies have more market power over their suppliers and a
better bargaining position with regard to customers.
In reference to the relationships between Prb. Def., Leverage and ROIC shown by
the Pearson correlation matrix, the inclusion of controls paints a more accurate picture.
Our models show that by controlling for the probability of bankruptcy, leverage has no
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statistically significant impact on ROIC, differing from the negative relationship found by
Deloof (2003). Additionally, we observe a negative statistically significant relationship
with the probability of default variable itself. This variable can be seen as a proxy of
bankruptcy cost, and analogues to the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem, the capital
structures of the companies are no longer influential when this effect is absorbed. The
coefficient on Prob.Def is highly significant at a 1% significance level and ranges between
-0.584 and -0.247 throughout the models. This would imply that a one percentage point
increase in the probability of defaulting within the next 12 months, is associated with
roughly half a percentage point lower return on invested capital. These results are as
predicted in the literature, as liquidity problems usually cause profitability to decrease.
For instance, management must avert its focus from the operations and profit-generating
activities, and rather put effort and resources into restoring the solvency of the company.
In addition, high probability of default is likely to lead to restructuring costs and suffocates
the willingness to invest due to the implications of debt overhang. In our models, FA Ratio
shows little to no significant impact on ROIC. This finding is not surprising, due to the
way return on invested capital is defined in this thesis. Financial income is excluded from
NOPAT, thus the return on fixed financial assets is not incorporated in the profitability
measure. Although the coefficients are of questionable magnitude, the regressions reveal
a positive link. Petersen et al. (2017) describe the financial assets as a liquidity buffer
which makes companies more resistant to economic turmoil. By lowering the exposure
towards cyclicality, the financial performance of the company is more robust. The last
control variable included in our models is the Cash. In the regression models conducted
on aggregated samples, it shows no sign of significance. The coefficients are consistently
positively related to ROIC and the economic interpretation may be that companies
with larger cash balances relative to total assets are less constrained in their day-to-
day operations. However, in analyses of various sub-samples, we find some interesting
implications. These will be described in the discussion of the relevant models.
The R2, the portion of variance in the dependent variable which is explained by the
independent variables in the regression model, is consistent at levels between 0.46 and
0.82. We see that when including the control variables in 4.2, the R2 jumps about six
percentage points. It is also worth mentioning the F-statistic of the regression tables,
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which are consistently significant at a 1% level. Significant F-statistics for these models
are expected due to the inclusion of fixed-effects and because the control variables included
are acknowledged as determinants of corporate profitability.
4.2.2 Cash Conversion Cycle and Return on Invested Capital
(H1)
In the following section, we will present the results from the analysis of Hypothesis 1,
where we explain the effects of the cash conversion cycle on return on invested capital.
The procedure is divided into two parts. First, we look at the panel data regression model
outlined in section 3.3 on the sample as a whole. We start by regressing ROIC on CCC
and the components individually, without the inclusion of control variables, but with
fixed firm and year effects. In the next step, the control variables are incorporated in the
same models. The regressions are summarised in table 4.2. Additionally, the equivalent
regression models with DuPont break-down of ROIC, comprised of NOPAT margin and
Asset Turnover, can be found in the appendix. These regressions are included to nuance
the understanding of how working capital management affects profitability. Secondly, we
have divided the data into different quartiles based on their five-year average performance
for each working capital management metric. The motivation is to explore whether there
are differentiated effects in the different performance brackets, and identify companies
for which effective working capital can be of most value. In light of the literature and
Hypothesis 1, we would expect the lowest-performing group to have the greater benefit of
improving their working capital policies.
The following table includes eight different panel data regression models. The models
are presented pairwise, where the first exclude firm-specific time-variant control variables.
Models (1) and (2) measure the aggregated effect of CCC on ROIC, while (3) to (8)
measure the effects of the components separately. (3) and (4) examine DSO, (5) and
(6) analyse DIO, and finally (7) and (8) focus on DPO. All models contain fixed effects
for both firms and years and include robust standard errors clustered by firm (Petersen,
2009).
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Table 4.2:
The Cash Conversion Cycle and Profitability for
Norwegian Companies Aggregated
The table displays panel data regression models for the relationship between ROIC and working capital
management. Both public and private companies are included in the sample, which contains 1,129
companies and 5,645 firm-year observations in the time span of 2014 to 2018. ROIC is regressed on each
working capital related measure separately. Moreover, these variables are lagged by one year and have been
scaled to represent 10 days of capital outstanding. Models (1) and (2) show the overall effect of CCC, (3)
and (4) depict DSO, (5) and (6) look at DIO, and the two last models (7) and (8) focus on DPO. The first
model in each pair excludes time-variable control variables. Furthermore, fixed firm and time effects are
included in every model, as indicated in the bottom panel of the table. Standard errors clustered for firms
and robust for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are displayed in parentheses. Corresponding tables
with the effects of CCC on ROIC broken down with the DuPont identity can be found in the appendix.
Dependent variable:
ROICt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CCCt−1 −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
DSOt−1 −0.002 −0.003∗∗
(0.002) (0.001)
DIOt−1 −0.005∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001)
DPOt−1 0.0005 0.00001
(0.001) (0.001)
Growtht 0.032∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Sizet 0.060∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
Prb.Def.t −0.459∗∗∗ −0.458∗∗∗ −0.459∗∗∗ −0.459∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Leveraget 0.028 0.029 0.034 0.030
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
FARatiot 0.006 0.013 0.009 0.013
(0.090) (0.091) (0.090) (0.091)
Casht 0.133 0.138 0.131 0.135
(0.102) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.5182 0.571 0.5166 0.5704 0.5181 0.5708 0.5164 0.5699
Adjusted R2 0.5182 0.5704 0.5165 0.5698 0.5181 0.5703 0.5163 0.5694
Observations 5,645 5,645 5,645 5,645 5,645 5,645 5,645 5,645
F Statistic 17.716∗∗∗ 81.931∗∗∗ 2.462 80.906∗∗∗ 16.850∗∗∗ 81.632∗∗∗ 0.266 80.172∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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The foremost result from the table is the coefficients on CCC. For both the models
with and without time-varying control variables, the coefficients are negative -0.003 and
significant at a 1% level. This signifies that companies with lower CCC on average
have higher return on invested capital, and is therefore supportive of Hypothesis 1 and
the literature (Lazaridis and Tryfonidis, 2006; Deloof, 2003; Shin and Soenen, 1998).
Furthermore, the finding suggests that 10 days reductions in CCC result in a 30 basis
point increase in ROIC, approximately 4% higher return on invested capital for the
median of the Norwegian companies in our sample. Although this may seem negligible, it
corresponds to roughly 10% higher valuation, all else being equal.1
Observations from the succeeding models based on the sub-components of CCC show
similar patterns. After incorporating control variables, the coefficient on DSO turns
significant at a 5% level and equates to -0.003. This could indicate that Norwegian
companies have greater benefit from increasing liquidity (Papadakis, 2007), as opposed to
growth and signalling effects from extending trade credit (Schwartz, 1974; Petersen and
Rajan, 1997). In terms of practical implications, reducing DSO by 10 days has the same
30 basis points effect as for CCC. Moreover, the identical effect can be seen from DIO in
models (5) and (6), significant at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The conforming results
from CCC, DSO and DIO could be an indication of the same underlying condition, and
congruent to the notion of the effect increased liquidity has on profitability, through growth
opportunities and increased solvency (Johnson and Soenen, 2003; Saleem and Rehman,
2011). Interestingly, models (7) and (8) do not show significant results for DPO. However,
the coefficients’ signs are positive and therefore in the direction hypothesised. It is difficult
to comment on their economic interpretations, but there could potentially be a strong
practice related to the use of cash discounts or a high degree of credit rationing, conflicting
with the liquidity effects among the Norwegian companies (Deloof, 2003; Petersen and
Rajan, 1997; Paul and Wilson, 2007).
1Based on the value driver formula of Koller et al. (2010):
V alue =
Invested Capital ∗ROIC ∗ (1− GrowthROIC )
WACC −Growth (4.1)
with median growth of 5.7%
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Table 4.3:
Quarterly Segmentation on Cash Conversion Cycle
The table shows panel data regression models for the relationship between ROIC and CCC. The
aggregated sample, containing both public and private firms, is segregated into quartiles based on
the companies’ relative performance with respect to CCC. The quartiles are calculated based on
the companies’ five-year averages in the period 2014 to 2018. The top performers are gathered in
Q1 and the bottom performers are found in Q4. Furthermore, CCC is lagged by one year and has
been scaled to represent 10 days of capital outstanding. All time-variable control variables are
included and fixed firm and time effects are incorporated in every model. Standard errors clustered
for firms and robust for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are displayed in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
ROIC
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
CCCt−1 0.001 −0.007∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Growtht 0.077∗∗ 0.004 0.078∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.003) (0.022) (0.001)
Sizet 0.018 0.049 0.103∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.038) (0.027) (0.023)
Prb.Def.t −0.466∗∗∗ −0.571∗∗∗ −0.427∗∗∗ −0.322∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.079) (0.074) (0.031)
Leveraget 0.072 0.070 0.030 −0.118∗∗
(0.176) (0.065) (0.062) (0.050)
FARatiot −0.083 0.066 0.141 −0.132
(0.202) (0.138) (0.116) (0.109)
Casht −0.157 0.347∗∗ 0.202∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.311) (0.153) (0.100) (0.062)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.4949 0.602 0.6785 0.8209
Adjusted R2 0.4924 0.6 0.6769 0.82
Observations 1,410 1,410 1,410 1,415
F Statistic 6.325∗∗∗ 20.993∗∗∗ 49.382∗∗∗ 260.242∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.4:
Quarterly Segmentation on Days Sales Outstanding
In the table, ROIC is regressed on DSO and the time-variant control variables to explore the
relationship between profitability and receivables management. Panel data regression models
with firm fixed effects and time fixed effects are applied throughout the columns. The aggregated
sample of public and private firms over the period 2014 to 2018 is divided into quartiles based
on the five-year average cycles of DSO. Q1 represents companies with the tightest credit policies
towards customers, while Q4 contains the companies with the most days receivables outstanding.
DSO is lagged by one year and constitutes 10 days of days receivables. Standard errors clustered
for firms and robust for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are shown in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
ROIC
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
DSOt−1 −0.010 −0.005 −0.003 −0.003∗
(0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Growtht 0.168∗∗∗ 0.001 0.045∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.003) (0.023) (0.001)
Sizet 0.026 0.145∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.019
(0.043) (0.038) (0.026) (0.033)
Prb.Def.t −0.260∗∗∗ −0.364∗∗∗ −0.562∗∗∗ −0.569∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.058) (0.095) (0.066)
Leveraget 0.004 0.047 0.040 0.023
(0.122) (0.086) (0.085) (0.080)
FARatiot 0.004 0.207 −0.042 −0.037
(0.187) (0.163) (0.117) (0.115)
Casht −0.121 0.348∗∗ 0.189 0.170
(0.299) (0.158) (0.139) (0.142)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.5426 0.6363 0.575 0.5776
Adjusted R2 0.5403 0.6345 0.5729 0.5755
Observations 1,410 1,410 1,410 1,415
F Statistic 8.751∗∗∗ 13.934∗∗∗ 24.823∗∗∗ 48.418∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.5:
Quarterly Segmentation on Days Inventory Outstanding
This table describes the relationship between ROIC and DIO for different inventory management
performance quartiles. The quartiles are determined by the five-year average inventory cycle
over the time span 2014 to 2018. Furthermore, the sample contains both public and private
companies. Each panel data models incorporate fixed effects of firms and years, and also includes
all the control variables presented in section 3.2.3. Companies with the shortest average DIO
are analysed in model Q1, and Q4 portrays the bottom quartile counterparts. In the table, DIO
represents 10 days of inventory outstanding with a one-year lag. For all models, standard errors
clustered for firms and robust for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are shown in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
ROIC
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
DIOt−1 −0.026 −0.006 −0.002 −0.003∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
Growtht 0.006 0.114∗∗∗ 0.026 0.044∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.041) (0.022) (0.001)
Sizet −0.002 0.140∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.044) (0.029) (0.024)
Prb.Def.t −0.584∗∗∗ −0.479∗∗∗ −0.384∗∗∗ −0.321∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.071) (0.065) (0.041)
Leveraget 0.059 0.051 0.086 −0.111∗∗
(0.092) (0.115) (0.093) (0.046)
FARatiot −0.342∗ 0.354∗∗ 0.149∗ 0.022
(0.179) (0.147) (0.081) (0.191)
Casht −0.209 0.146 0.389∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗
(0.287) (0.166) (0.164) (0.070)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.471 0.6415 0.6714 0.8053
Adjusted R2 0.4684 0.6397 0.6697 0.8043
Observations 1,410 1,410 1,410 1,415
F Statistic 8.683∗∗∗ 23.526∗∗∗ 36.628∗∗∗ 202.930∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
4.2 Main Results 59
Table 4.6:
Quarterly Segmentation on Days Payables Outstanding
This last table of quartile analysis displays the effects of DPO on ROIC. Due to the negative
additive relationship between the cash conversion cycle and days payables outstanding, the
presumed top-performers are gathered in column Q4. Consequently, companies with the least
days of payables outstanding are located in Q1. The quarters are estimated based on five-year
averages from 2014 to 2018, for public and private companies. In the regressions, DPO is lagged
one year and scaled to display 10 days payables outstanding. The models contain firm specific
control variables in addition to firm and year fixed effects. Associated standard errors clustered
for firms and robust for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are included in the parentheses.
Dependent variable:
ROIC
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
DPOt−1 −0.0003 −0.001 0.002 −0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Growtht 0.00002 0.133∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.034) (0.038) (0.001)
Sizet 0.090∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.002 0.063∗
(0.029) (0.039) (0.040) (0.038)
Prb.Def.t −0.247∗∗ −0.479∗∗∗ −0.567∗∗∗ −0.413∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.077) (0.077) (0.069)
Leveraget 0.022 −0.109 0.116 0.023
(0.065) (0.081) (0.149) (0.110)
FARatiot −0.061 0.197 −0.070 0.219
(0.168) (0.148) (0.108) (0.194)
Casht 0.019 0.077 0.149 0.352∗
(0.169) (0.160) (0.236) (0.195)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.4599 0.6416 0.5508 0.6308
Adjusted R2 0.4572 0.6398 0.5485 0.629
Observations 1,410 1,410 1,410 1,415
F Statistic 4.773∗∗∗ 23.603∗∗∗ 24.799∗∗∗ 44.886∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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In the four tables displayed above, we show the full specified models from 4.2, but for
sub-samples based on average five-year performance of each working capital metric. Each
metric is treated separately: first CCC, then DSO, followed by DIO and, finally DPO.
For the first three, model Q1 signifies the top performers, while Q4 is the low end. For
DPO, the order is the opposite due to its negative relation to CCC. All models describe
the relationship between the metric in question and return on invested capital and, as
previously stated, we believe there are diminishing returns to working capital as companies
approaches their inherent “optimum”.2
In the first four columns of table 4.3, we look at how the effect on corporate profitability
varies with the performance of companies’ working capital management, measured by
cash conversion cycle. All coefficients on CCC except for Q1 are negative and statistically
significant. This supports our initial notion that less efficient companies have a larger
benefit on return on invested capital of shortening the cash conversion cycle. Although not
explicitly stated in the literature, there are some suggestions that the effect is increasing
with the length of the cash conversion cycle (Richards and Laughlin, 1980; Juan García-
Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2007; Faulkender and Wang, 2006). However, the coefficients
reveal that it is the second best performers that have the largest effect, followed by the
third and fourth quartiles. They take the values of -0.007, -0.005 and -0.003, respectively,
at a 1% significance level. This may indicate that the relationship between CCC and
ROIC is of a non-linear nature. More importantly, given the current state of the companies
in these quartiles, we believe that the results are of high relevance, both statistically and
economically.
The same exercise has been done for all of the three sub-components in tables 4.4
to 4.6. For DSO, we observe a negative coefficient for the fourth quartile, at a 10%
significance level. This is highly supportive of our hypothesis, as the lowest performers
seem to have the greatest effect of efficiency improvements.
Looking at DIO in table 4.5, the fourth quartile returns negative and significant
coefficient at a 1 % level. Yet again, we observe a large negative effect for the fourth
2To clarify, working capital is vital for day-to-day operations and there must therefore be internal
restrictions to cuts in the cash conversion cycle
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quartile, strengthening the argument of diminishing marginal returns to improvements
in the cash conversion cycle. An improvement of 10 days in DIO yield a 30 basis points
improvement in ROIC on average. With reference to the descriptive statistics, this
represents a rather substantial improvement.
Table 4.6, where we look at the effect of DPO, does not return any results of
statistical significance. Although in contradiction with our initial hypothesis, it is slightly
less surprising when considering the results in table 4.2. It seems as though Norwegian
companies are less sensitive to payable management, possibly due to attractive conditions
in the debt capital market in the five-year period, which marginalise the effects of
credit rationing (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Another related explanation could be that
favourable credit terms in the markets enable Norwegian companies to take advantage of
cash discounts rather than suffering the implied borrowing cost of trade credit by delaying
payments to suppliers (Deloof, 2003).
Considering DPO, there is some uncertainty related to whether the impact of working
capital policies have diminishing effects on return on invested capital. Interestingly, in all
of the four tables, the top performers show few signs of a negative relationship, which
could suggest that these companies already operate optimally. In addition, further analysis
of CCC, DSO and DIO shows the characteristics hypothesised, signifying higher value
of working capital management in the lower brackets. Overall the results are highly
supportive of a negative relationship between the cash conversion cycle and return on
invested capital, indicating that efficient working capital management does indeed improve
profitability.
The coefficients on the Cash control variable add additional support to the notion
that the marginal return on excess cash is diminishing. In tables 4.3 and 4.5, we observe
both economically and statistically significant results for Q2-Q4 and Q3-Q4, respectively.
Moreover, the only coefficients significant at a 1% level are those of Q4 in both tables.
These results are in accordance with our suggestion in Hypothesis 1, and are also supported
by the existing literature (Faulkender and Wang, 2006).
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4.2.3 Public versus Private and the Effect of Agency Costs (H2)
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the differences in working capital
practice between public and private firms. First we conduct Welch’s two-sample t-test for
unequal variances for each working capital management metrics, in order to assess whether
the discrepancies observed in section 3.4 have significant statistic support. Furthermore,
we believe it is important to investigate the effect on return on invested capital for the
two groups, as we believe this partially explains why public companies have shorter cash
conversion cycles. Hence, we follow the same procedure as with Hypothesis 1 and use the
base-model with binary variables for public companies interacted with the working capital
metrics. The results are summarised in table 4.8. Unequal returns on the same types of
investment could justify different practices in the two groups. In light of Hypothesis 2,
dissimilar returns could originate from agency costs and therefore be an explanation for
the longer cash conversion cycle of private companies compared to public. However, we
recognise that this is an indirect way of measuring the presence of agency costs, with a lot
of distorting factors. Thus, in the last part of this section, we will methodically analyse
the effect of agency costs on the cash conversion cycle directly. In this part, we first regress
the working capital variables on acknowledged proxies for agency costs in the literature,
before we utilise two types of exogenous shocks to agency costs, replacement of CFO and
deregulation of the reporting rules on the Oslo Stock Exchange. We try to capture these
effects on the cash conversion cycle by applying frameworks of Difference-in-Difference
estimation.
Table 4.7 below displays the results of the Welch’s two-sample t-test for unequal
variances. We have tested the means of CCC and its components for differences between
the public and private sub-samples. First, we control for firm-specific determinants by
running panel data regression models with the control variables and fixed effects. Then
the fitted values from these regressions are applied in the t-tests3. Public company means
are subtracted from the means of private companies, thus on a particular metric, positive
t-stats signifies longer cycles for private companies. Table 4.8 explores the relationship
between CCC and the various working capital metrics, differentiated for public and private
companies. The panel data regression models are similar to the base model applied under
3See appendix for these panel data regressions
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Hypothesis 1, with incorporation of the Public interaction term on the particular working
capital management variable being analysed.
Table 4.7:
Welch’s Two-Sample T-Test for Unequal Variances
The table displays results of two sample t-test for differences in the means of CCC and
its components between public and private companies. Working capital management
variables have been estimated with panel data regression models containing the control
variables and fixed firm and year effects to adjust for firm-specific determinants.
Thereafter Welch’s two sample t-tests are applied to the fitted values. The means
of public companies are subtracted from private companies in one-sided tests.
Means of Fitted Values
Variable Private Public t-statistic p-value
CCC 7.454 4.879 2.576 0.005
DSO 5.831 5.418 1.713 0.044
DIO 7.038 11.443 -5.826 0.000
DPO 5.415 11.982 -7.324 0.000
The results from the first row confirm that the CCCs of public companies on average
are shorter compared to those of private firms. Moreover, the t-statistic is significant at
1%. Additionally, the test on DSO shows the same outcome, but only at a 5% significance
level. Both DIO and DPO show differences in means at a 1% significance level. From the
table, we also observe that these t-statistics are negative, implying more days inventory
and payables outstanding in public firms. This is to be expected from DPO due to the
negative additive relation to CCC. However, the negative estimate on DIO indicates that
public companies are holding inventory significantly longer than private companies. A
possible explanation could be that public companies are more prone to stock-outs or
experience more severe consequences of them (Deloof, 2003; Blazenko and Vandezande,
2003; Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986). This result could also be attributed to unknown
characteristics of our particular sample of public companies, apart from the factors adjusted
for in the regression models from which the fitted values are derived. Nevertheless, it is
noteworthy that CCC is significant lower for public companies in spite of higher DIO, a
result that underpins the notion of structural differences in working capital management
in the two groups. Moreover, with reference to Hypothesis 2, there is reason to believe
that private companies experience more agency costs on average (Jensen, 1986; Opler
et al., 1999; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). The latter will be subject for further investigation
in the following analyses.
64 4.2 Main Results
Table 4.8:
The Cash Conversion Cycle and Profitability
for Public and Private Companies
The table portrays the relationship between profitability and working capital management, and
the marginal effects seen among public companies. The sample consists of 1,129 public and
private companies over the period 2014 to 2018. ROIC is regressed on each working capital
related measure separately in panel data regressions. Moreover, these variables are lagged by
one year and have been scaled to represent 10 days of capital outstanding. The variable Public
is interacted with the working capital management variables and describes the marginal effect
of increasing working capital cycles for public companies. Each model includes firm specific
time-variable controls and fixed effects for both firms and years. The standard errors in the
parentheses are clustered for firms and are heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust.
Dependent variable:
ROICt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CCCt−1 −0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
CCCt−1*Public 0.001
(0.002)
DSOt−1 −0.002∗
(0.001)
DSOt−1*Public −0.006∗∗
(0.003)
DIOt−1 −0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
DIOt−1*Public −0.002
(0.003)
DPOt−1 0.0001
(0.001)
DPOt−1*Public −0.0002
(0.001)
Growtht 0.032∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Sizet 0.060∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
Prb.Def.t −0.459∗∗∗ −0.458∗∗∗ −0.459∗∗∗ −0.459∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Leveraget 0.028 0.030 0.035 0.030
(0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050)
FARatiot 0.005 0.013 0.009 0.013
(0.090) (0.091) (0.090) (0.091)
Casht 0.134 0.139 0.132 0.136
(0.102) (0.103) (0.103) (0.102)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.571 0.5705 0.5708 0.5699
Adjusted R2 0.5704 0.5699 0.5702 0.5693
Observations 5,645 5,645 5,645 5,645
F Statistic 71.725∗∗∗ 71.014∗∗∗ 71.480∗∗∗ 70.136∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Looking at the first model in table 4.8, only the CCC coefficient for the aggregated
sample shows statistical significance. It amounts to -0.003, which is statistically significant
at a 1% level. Regarding the public interaction term, there are no significant differences
on the return on invested capital between public and private companies.
The most interesting finding of this table is found in column 2. The DSO coefficient
on the second model is negative and significant, with a coefficient of -0.002 at a 10%
significance level. Interestingly, the interaction term between DSO and Public shows a
negative marginal effect on return on invested capital. It is -0.006 at a 5% significance
level, indicating an additional increase of 60 basis points on ROIC for 10 days reduction
in DSO, compared to private companies. On one hand, this result could be attributed to
lower agency costs because of higher transparency and frequent monitoring (Bushman
and Smith, 2001; Black, 2000; Huang and Zhang, 2011). However, since similar results
are absent from the other variables, it is difficult to make a definitive conclusion. On the
other hand, this could also be caused by high market power among public companies,
which enables them to dictate terms to a higher degree than their private peers (Richards
and Laughlin, 1980). Still, this interpretation does not rule out the role of agency costs as
a determinant for working capital policies. For DIO and DPO, there are no significant
results from Public interactions affecting the return on invested capital. The DIO variable
is unchanged from the results shown previously in table 4.2, while DPO does not yield
any significant results from this analysis either.
In regard to Hypothesis 2, the results from table 4.8 do not give a clear indication that
the difference in management of working capital between public and private companies can
be ascribed to differing returns on the invested capital. Moreover, we have to look elsewhere
for an explanation for the discrepancy found in the two sub-samples. Additionally, there
is no strong evidence for presence of agency costs as a determinant factor. As mentioned,
this is to be expected due to the indirect relationship of agency costs on ROIC through
CCC. As elaborated on in chapter 2, this relationship is distorted from various elements,
and in the following analysis we will therefore try to measure the effect of agency costs in
a more direct manner.
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In the two following tables we present panel regression models where we regress the
working capital variables on the agency cost proxies Asset Turnover and Cost Ratio. The
regressions are performed on the aggregated sample of both public and private companies
in order to establish the link between working capital management and agency costs
empirically. The models all contain control variables and fixed effects.
Table 4.9 yields very interesting results. Firstly, there is a highly significant negative
relationship between CCC and Asset Turnover, supporting the findings in the literature
that agency costs increase investments in working capital (Jensen, 1986; Ferreira and
Vilela, 2004). Although the coefficient is significant at a 1% level, the economic impact
is questionable. With reference to the descriptive statistics, a ∼ 0.3 increase in Asset
Turnover, representing a 20% increase, reduces CCC by approximately four days. Similar
results are shown by DSO and DIO. On the other hand, DPO displays the same negative
effect, which is unexpected. Moreover, this could be an indication of an unobserved effect
and an endogeneity problem, as mentioned in section 3.4. This argument is strengthened
by the observations in table 4.10, where the only significant link between working capital
management and Cost Ratio is DPO at a 10% significance level.
As a side note, the two tables do, however, show some noteworthy results with regard
to other parts of the working capital literature. The negative relationship between Size
and DSO has been shown to be connected to market power (Shin and Soenen, 1998).
Furthermore, the negative significant relationship between DPO and probability of default
underline the conjecture of Deloof (2003) that struggling companies find it difficult to
pay suppliers and therefore have more payables outstanding. Finally, the negative results
shown on the Leverage coefficients for both DSO and DPO are in line with the theory of
credit rationing (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Schwartz, 1974), indicating that companies
with easy access to capital will extend trade credit and pay suppliers early.
Overall, the tables point in the direction of a link between working capital and agency
costs, although, there are reasons to believe that there are obscuring factors. In the last
part of this section we will therefore utilise factor of exogenous nature to try to estimate
the relationship between the two, and also the difference in working capital management
observed between public and private companies in Norway.
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Table 4.9:
Working Capital Management and Asset Turnover
as a Proxy for Agency Costs
The table describes the relationship between agency costs and working capital management for
1,129 public and private companies in Norway in the time-span 2014 to 2018. CCC, DSO, DIO
and DPO are regressed on the agency cost proxy Asset Turnover. The models include firm
specific time-variable controls and fixed effects for both firms and years. The standard errors in
the parentheses are clustered for firms and are heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust.
Dependent variable:
CCC DSO DIO DPO
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Asset Turnover −12.524∗∗∗ −11.572∗∗∗ −12.602∗∗∗ −11.650∗∗∗
(2.946) (2.443) (3.282) (3.073)
Growth 4.351∗ 3.282∗∗ 3.181∗ 2.112∗∗∗
(2.523) (1.376) (1.666) (0.619)
Size −13.477 −9.807∗∗ −12.124 −8.454
(8.812) (3.938) (8.158) (6.226)
Prb. Def. −12.721 6.572 1.573 20.866∗∗∗
(8.467) (4.340) (7.274) (4.610)
Leverage 11.383 −22.470∗∗∗ 5.862 −27.991∗∗∗
(19.297) (5.633) (19.458) (9.222)
FA Ratio −98.499∗∗∗ −63.255∗∗∗ −64.500∗∗∗ −29.256∗
(22.702) (16.499) (17.222) (17.450)
Cash 3.284 3.155 1.082 0.953
(7.827) (4.963) (6.003) (3.914)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.7854 0.7423 0.8087 0.8004
Adjusted R2 0.7852 0.742 0.8085 0.8002
Observations 5,645 5,645 5,645 5,645
F Statistic 23.846∗∗∗ 65.857∗∗∗ 21.076∗∗∗ 32.914∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.10:
Working Capital Management and Cost Ratio
as a Proxy for Agency Costs
The table shows panel data regression models which describe the relationship between the working
capital management variables, CCC, DSO, DIO and DPO, and the agency cost proxy Cost
Ratio. The sample consists of 1,129 public and private companies in Norway over the period
from 2014 to 2018. In the models, both firm and year fixed effects are included, in addition to
company characteristic time-variant control variables. Associated standard errors clustered for
firms and robust for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are included in the parentheses.
Dependent variable:
CCC DSO DIO DPO
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cost Ratio 4.214 12.048 23.608 31.443∗
(18.354) (7.834) (15.180) (17.944)
Growth 4.187∗ 3.166∗∗ 3.100∗∗ 2.079∗∗∗
(2.484) (1.284) (1.552) (0.510)
Size −17.082∗∗ −12.135∗∗∗ −13.370∗ −8.424
(7.915) (3.818) (7.549) (5.268)
Prb. Def. −13.080 4.891 −1.993 15.978∗∗∗
(8.134) (4.641) (6.337) (4.543)
Leverage 17.661 −16.801∗∗∗ 11.867 −22.595∗∗
(19.319) (5.372) (19.711) (8.940)
FA Ratio −86.535∗∗∗ −51.625∗∗∗ −51.095∗∗∗ −16.185
(21.091) (15.447) (13.073) (14.589)
Cash 4.303 3.499 0.690 −0.114
(7.756) (4.696) (6.447) (4.142)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.7835 0.7342 0.807 0.7981
Adjusted R2 0.7833 0.7338 0.8067 0.7978
Observations 5,645 5,645 5,645 5,645
F Statistic 17.957∗∗∗ 44.188∗∗∗ 14.975∗∗∗ 25.052∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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In tables 4.11 and 4.12, we apply two different shocks to agency costs to measure
the effects on working capital management: deregulation of reporting rules at the Oslo
Stock Exchange and the replacement of CFOs for public companies, respectively. The
two tables are structured similarly, where each column describes the effects of the shock
on the working capital management metrics separately. The first is estimated using
Difference-in-Difference methodology with panel data. Each regression model therefore
contains fixed effects for firms and years, and includes robust standard errors clustered for
firms. In the second table, we follow a Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference estimation
with variable treatment patterns and panel data. These models also contain fixed firm
and year effects. We refer to section 3.3 for further elaboration of the technical execution.
In table 4.11, we have applied the deregulation of the accounting rules on the Oslo
Stock Exchange as a shock on agency costs. The coefficient on DiD indicates the effect of
the deregulation on the companies’ different working capital management metrics. As
is evident from the table, the signs of the coefficients on the DiD estimator are quite
ambiguous, and unexpected according to our hypothesis and prior research. It has been
found that the restrictiveness of financial reporting regulations has a negative effect on the
magnitude of agency costs (Pae et al., 2006; Levitt, 1998). By loosening the requirement
for IFRS reporting from quarterly to semi-annual, the shareholders receive less frequent
information, which reduces the transparency in the market. This implies higher agency
costs, which in turn is positively related to the cash conversion cycle (Jensen, 1986; Opler
et al., 1999; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). However, table 4.11 displays indications of the
opposite. We see that the coefficient of the DiD estimator, when regressed on CCC, is
negative and statistically significant at a 5% level. Furthermore, this seem to be driven
by the coefficient on DPO, which is positive and significant at the same level. At face
value, the deregulation resulted in a 28 days reduction in CCC and could indicate other
side-effects apart from the impact on agency costs. Moreover, the shock in itself might
not be strong enough to cause an effect. Although going in a less restrictive direction,
the legislation still demands semi annual reporting in accordance with IFRS standards.
In addition, we know that several companies still report in accordance with IFRS on a
quarterly basis. These potential explanations will be subject for further discussion in
section 5.2, where we will elaborate on the limitations of our thesis.
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Table 4.11:
The Impact of Deregulation of Reporting Practices
on Agency Costs and the Cash Conversion Cycle
The regressions in the table depict the effects of the deregulation of the Oslo Stock Exchange’s
reporting rules on the working capital management metrics. Difference-in-Difference methodology
for panel data is applied, with the inclusion of control variables and fixed firm effects and fixed
year effects. The variable DiD is the Difference-in-Difference estimator, which shows the impact of
the deregulation for public firms in the period from 2017 compared to the control group of private
companies. Moreover, it serves to indicate differences in agency costs between public and private
companies. The sample consists of 5,645 firm-year observations, and the post-period constitutes
one year of observations due to the lagged dependent variables. Furthermore, the aggregated
sample contains 270 firm-year observations for public companies. Standard errors clustered
for firms and robust for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are displayed in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
CCC DSO DIO DPO
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DiD −27.728∗∗ −0.609 −5.657 21.462∗∗
(13.067) (3.085) (8.842) (8.842)
Growth 4.061∗ 3.112∗∗ 2.976∗ 2.027
(2.464) (1.342) (1.634) (1.634)
Size −17.798∗∗ −13.621∗∗∗ −16.313∗∗ −12.136
(8.710) (3.786) (7.920) (7.920)
Prb. Def. −12.180 6.889 1.955 21.023∗∗∗
(8.433) (4.395) (7.246) (7.246)
Leverage 17.026 −16.623∗∗∗ 12.104 −21.544
(19.001) (5.366) (19.496) (19.496)
FA Ratio −84.173∗∗∗ −52.417∗∗∗ −52.219∗∗∗ −20.463
(21.123) (15.619) (13.659) (13.659)
Cash 4.235 4.373 2.341 2.479
(7.604) (4.880) (6.008) (6.008)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.7846 0.7336 0.8065 0.7977
Adjusted R2 0.7843 0.7332 0.8063 0.7974
Observations 5,645 5,645 5,645 5,645
F Statistic 21.075∗∗∗ 42.646∗∗∗ 13.417∗∗∗ 23.727∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.12:
The Effect of Replacing the CFO
on Agency Costs and the Cash Conversion Cycle
The table shows the impact of replacing the CFO for public companies in the time-span
2014 to 2018 on the working capital management measures. The change of CFO represents
a shock in agency costs and the effects are estimated by applying a Difference-in-Difference-
in-Difference framework with panel data regression models. The analysis uses two control
groups: public and private companies without intervention in the CFO position. The
variable DDD identifies the effect in the post-period, which follow a variable pattern for
each company. For the control group, the post-period is determined as 2016 to 2018 based
on the median year of CFO replacement among public companies in the period. The
sample consists of 340 firm-year observations and all regressions contain firm-specific time-
variable controls and fixed effects for both firms and years. Robust standard errors for
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, clustered by firms, are reported in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
CCC DSO DIO DPO
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DDD 15.711 9.628∗ 0.534 −5.550
(15.250) (5.325) (19.528) (19.746)
Time −8.981 4.075 −13.416 −0.359
(11.267) (4.202) (8.726) (11.259)
Time*Publ_index −11.771 −4.829 7.060 14.001
(9.139) (3.746) (13.057) (15.555)
Growth 9.174∗∗∗ 3.922∗∗∗ 8.113∗∗∗ 2.862∗∗
(2.239) (0.670) (1.909) (1.294)
Size 43.055∗∗ 7.846 13.799 −21.410
(20.417) (9.839) (20.249) (21.975)
Prb. Def. −26.990∗ −22.830∗∗ −25.909 −21.748
(15.515) (9.115) (18.353) (16.754)
Leverage 56.125 5.946 63.772∗ 13.592
(51.552) (12.357) (33.062) (48.539)
FA Ratio 2.524 7.243 12.005 16.725
(44.925) (23.292) (38.057) (68.964)
Cash 4.744 21.860∗ −27.251 −10.135
(31.770) (12.984) (24.840) (22.378)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.9191 0.9064 0.9051 0.9911
Adjusted R2 0.9169 0.9039 0.9026 0.9908
Observations 340 340 340 340
F Statistic 23.819∗∗∗ 88.514∗∗∗ 10.567∗∗∗ 2.931∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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In table 4.12, we have used the replacement of CFO as a shock on agency costs with
a Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference (DDD) methodology, as we expect the change of
CFO to have a negative effect on agency costs (Geiger and North, 2006; Healy and Wahlen,
1999; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). The DDD variable represents the treatment effect
on the treatment group; see section 3.3.4 for further elaboration. The DDD estimator
is the coefficient on DDD, and it is interpreted as the effect of replacing the CFO for
public companies in the post period, compared to the public and private companies in the
control groups without CFO intervention.
Analyses of the DDD estimators show results conflicting with the findings of the
existing literature concerning the relationship between the CFO-replacement, agency costs
and the implied effect on working capital management (Jensen, 1986; Opler et al., 1999;
Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Additionally, all the coefficients are pointing in the opposite
direction to our expectations stated in Hypothesis 2, and the DSO model yields a positive
coefficient, significant at a 10% level. This serves as an indicator of worsening working
capital management. The other coefficients on the working capital management variables
are, however, not statistically significant and we are not able to claim with confidence
that changes in the CFO position actually decrease the efficiency of working capital
management.
Based on the analyses in table 4.11 and 4.12, we do not have statistical significant
evidence supporting a conclusion that agency cost is the reason for the large difference in
working capital balances between public and private companies.
73
5 Conclusion and Limitations
5.1 Conclusion
The objective of this thesis is bipartite. Firstly, we examine the effect of working
capital management on return on invested capital for Norwegian companies. Secondly, we
attempt to explain the differences in working capital management between publicly listed
and privately owned companies from the perspective of agency theory. More concisely, we
want to investigate whether the distinctive characteristics in these two ownership structures
cause different exposure to agency costs, and subsequently different cash conversion cycle
policies. Hence, our research question was stated as follows:
Can the Agency Problem explain the difference in the cash conversion cycles
of Norwegian public and private companies?
In our results section, we present findings indicating that there is a statistically
significant relationship between the cash conversion cycle and return on invested capital
for Norwegian companies. We also observe confirming relationships between the two
sub-components, days sales outstanding and days inventory outstanding, and return on
invested capital, implying that operational profitability is more sensitive to management
of inventories and receivables relative to the management of payables in Norway. These
results support the findings of the existing literature (Deloof, 2003; Shin and Soenen, 1998;
Lazaridis and Tryfonidis, 2006). Moreover, we discovered indications that the return on
improvement is of a diminishing nature, as indirectly suggested by Richards and Laughlin
(1980) and Juan García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2007). Although not perfectly
consistent, our findings reveal that companies outside the top-performing quartile have a
larger effect of improvement, compared to the top-performing firms.
In the second section of the analysis, we found statistically significant evidence of
systematical differences in working capital practice between public and private companies
in Norway. Moreover, we unveiled marginal effects in the relationship between days sales
outstanding and return on invested capital for public companies, which could serve as
a partial explanation for the differences in cash conversion cycle. In further analyses of
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relationship between agency costs and the cash conversion cycle, we found some indications
of a link between the two. However, analyses of exogenous shocks on agency costs provided
unexpected statistically significant results. Furthermore, the signs of the DiD estimators
on CCC and DPO in table 4.11 indicate a negative relationship between agency costs and
the cash conversion cycle. In table 4.12, the DDD-estimators are more ambiguous and
carefully point to the same negative relationship, but this time in form of DSO. However,
the results are hardly significant. Based on these findings, we are able to conclude that
there is a difference in how private and public companies manage their working capital.
Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that this inconsistency is caused by agency costs.
These findings emphasize the importance of efficient working capital management.
Moreover, it underpins the potential in optimizing the cash conversion cycle for private
companies in particular. However, the focus on working capital for public companies has
also been shown to be rewarding. Especially, when considering the effect on valuation,
improvements of the cash conversion cycle have the potential of improving the company
value drastically. Furthermore, a reduction of investments in working capital affects the
cash flow in a direct manner, which subsequently is perceived as attractive by shareholders.
5.2 Limitations
An important feature of this chapter is the elaboration on the limitations with this
thesis. In the following sections, there will be a discussion of these limitations, and the
implications they have in regard to our analysis and results.
Firstly, we have used a data sample of companies with reported 2018-revenues above
100 million NOK. Although this provides us with a large data set, we exclude the vast
majority of Norwegian companies. Thus, we cannot be certain that the observed effects
hold for all Norwegian companies. A second limitation to the data set is the restricted
number of public companies compared to private companies. Due to our restrictions
for the companies included in the data set, we have excluded several of the companies
currently trading on the Oslo Stock Exchange, mainly due to lack of financial data for the
period analysed. We believe the lack of data on the public side of the comparison is the
primary reason for the absence of significance in some of our results, and particularly in
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the last part of our analysis.
Further, we have combined data from two different databases. Ideally, we would use
the same database for the entire dataset to make all individuals perfectly comparable.
However, the access to data on private Norwegian companies is fairly limited, and requires
use of specific databases. Thus, we were forced to combine data from the Orbis database
and the Soliditet database. The implication is that there is some divergence in how the
financial statements are reported in each database, and we had to aggregate and make
sure the data was comparable manually.
Besides this, the numbers used in our data are consistently year-end figures. Thus, we
are not able to capture the operational behaviour throughout the year. The implications
of only looking at year-end reporting are that natural fluctuations may be perceived
incorrectly. An example is in the case 31st of December being on a Saturday or Sunday.
Given that a payment is due the last day of the year, the payment will be registered in
the following year, and thus be reported as account payables in the current year. This
could wrongly be interpreted as declining payables management year-over-year when in
reality no policy changes were made. Another complication with the annual reporting is
the incentives applying to the management. As discussed in section 2.3.3, by pushing the
payment of deferrals to the next year, the management is able to report a stronger cash
balance due to higher payables and a more cash on hand. Ideally, we would have looked
at quarterly figures in order to get a more precise picture of the practice through the year.
However, this information is not available for private companies in Norway, and hence,
such an analysis is impossible.
Regarding the proxies on agency cost, endogeneity is an ominous limitation. Although
supported by existing research as feasible proxies, these are quite noisy and we could
expect that several factors in the error term could affect these variables. However, the
thesis does not rely entirely on the variables to determine the link between working capital
and agency costs.
Further, we need to consider the limitations in the last section of our analysis. When
applying the Difference-in-Difference methodology, it is always an issue associated with the
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exogeneity of the shocks. In our case, we are most concerned about the CFO-replacement,
as we suspect that such an event might affect other aspects of corporate operations than
merely the working capital practice. As the principal financial manager of the company,
the CFO has a large impact on various decisions from capital structure to growth strategies.
However, we believe these effects materialise over a longer horizon, and thus the effect on
working capital is believed to be fairly exogenous. An additional problem with this shock
is the magnitude of information collected. Ultimately, we would have analysed the effect
of a CFO replacement for more companies in our sample, but due to the time restrictions
of this thesis, we have only been able to gather this information for a minor selection.
Considering the effects of deregulations on the Oslo Stock Exchange, we could question to
what extent this actually would affect the working capital practice of companies as the
impact on transparency is somewhat limited. These companies still report according to
the IFRS standards semi-anually, and some companies have continued with the quarterly
reporting practice.
Finally, we have to assume constant effects of the shocks when applying the DiD
and DDD methodologies. Given the very nature of our shocks, and particularly the CFO
replacement, this assumption might be violated. As discussed in the literature review, the
reason why we expect declining agency costs in association with a CFO substitution is
the different incentives that appeal to the old and the new CFO. However, based on this
argumentation, we might see that the incentives of the new CFO only holds for the first
phase of the tenure. As the time progresses, they could converge towards the incentives
of the old CFO, putting the company in the same position as it was prior to the CFO
replacement. Fortunately, our post-period is relatively short, which we believe mitigate
this risk.
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5.3 Proposals for Future Research
One recommendation for future research is to further investigate the discrepancy in
the cash conversion cycle between private and public companies. One approach is to look
to other markets where the access on data for public companies is larger. Another angle
which would be interesting to explore, is a comparison of the working capital practice in
different geographical markets, and the causes for potential differences. As previously
mentioned, there is an extensive amount of research on the financial implications of
working capital management. However, the vast majority of this research focuses on a
single market. A multi-national comparison offers more insight into what dictates the
optimal working capital policy. Moreover, best practice for a given company might be
found outside the companies’ home market.
In addition, we believe there is a lot of potential for future research in the Norwegian
sphere. Firstly, we believe that an extension of the time period analysed allows for
interesting discoveries. The financial climate (aside from the oil price shock) has been
stable throughout our chosen period. As stable and low interest rates are one of the
arguments for the limited effect of days payables outstanding on corporate profitability in
our results, we believe it would be interesting to look at a period with larger fluctuations
in market conditions.
Furthermore, future research should dig deeper into the explanation for why there
exist differences in working capital policies between public and private companies in
Norway. We have now opened a new chapter in working capital research, and hope that
future papers with more flexible time-frames are able to expand on our ideas, or explore
alternative solutions. Moreover, we hope that there will be an expansion on the connection
between working capital and agency costs in the forthcoming. As we have stated, with
support from the existing literature, there seems to be a theoretical link between the two
concepts. We believe that an investigation of the practical relationship between the two
will be of both theoretical and practical value. In this regard, to further explore the role
of the CFO in association with working capital management might be a intriguing path
to follow.
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86Table A0.1:
Industry Categorisation
No. A*38 code ISIC Rev. 4/NACE Rev. 2 Divisions Included
1 A Agriculture, forestry and fishing 01 to 03 Yes
2 B Mining and quarrying 05 to 09 Yes
3 CA Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products 10 to 12 Yes
4 CB Manufacture of textiles, apparel, leather and related products 13 to 15 Yes
5 CC Manufacture of wood and paper products, and printing 16 to 18 Yes
6 CD Manufacture of coke, and refined petroleum products 19 Yes
7 CE Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 20 Yes
8 CF Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical products 21 Yes
9 CG Manufacture of rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic mineral products 22 and 23 Yes
10 CH Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 24 and 25 Yes
11 CI Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 26 Yes
12 CJ Manufacture of electrical equipment 27 Yes
13 CK Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 28 Yes
14 CL Manufacture of transport equipment 29 and 30 Yes
15 CM Other manufacturing, and repair and installation of machinery and equipment 31 to 33 Yes
16 D Electricity, gas, steam and air-conditioning supply 35 Yes
17 E Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation 36 to 39 Yes
18 F Construction 41 to 43 Yes
19 G Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 45 to 47 Yes
20 H Transportation and storage 49 to 53 Yes
21 I Accommodation and food service activities 55 and 56 Yes
22 JA Publishing, audiovisual and broadcasting activities 58 to 60 Yes
23 JB Telecommunications 61 Yes
24 JC IT and other information services 62 and 63 Yes
25 K Financial and insurance activities 64 to 66 No
26 L Real estate activities 68 Yes
27 MA Legal, accounting, management, architecture, engineering, technical testing and analysis activities 69 to 71 Yes
28 MB Scientific research and development 72 Yes
29 MC Other professional, scientific and technical activities 73 to 75 Yes
30 N Administrative and support service activities 77 to 82 Yes
31 O Public administration and defence, compulsory social security 84 No
32 P Education 85 No
33 QA Human health services 86 Yes
34 QB Residential care and social work activities 87 and 88 Yes
35 R Arts, entertainment and recreation 90 to 93 Yes
36 S Other services 94 to 96 No
37 T Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods- and services-producing activities of households for own use 97 and 98 No
38 U Activities of extra-territorial organisations and bodies 99 No
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Figure A0.1:
DuPont Model
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Table A0.2:
The Effect of Cash Conversion Cycle on NOPAT Margin
The table displays panel data regression models for the relationship between NOPAT Margin and working
capital management. Both public and private companies are included in the sample, which contain 1,129
companies and 5,645 firm-year observations in the time span of 2014 to 2018. NOPAT Margin is regressed
on each working capital related measure separately. Moreover, these variables are lagged by one year and
have been scaled to represent 10 days of capital outstanding. Models (1) and (2) show the overall effect
of CCC, (3) and (4) depict DSO, (5) and (6) look at DIO, and the two last models (7) and (8) focus on
DPO. The first model in each pair excludes time-variable control variables. Furthermore, fixed firm and
time effects are included in every model, as indicated in the bottom panel of the table. Standard errors
clustered for firms and robust for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are displayed in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
NOPAT_margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CCC −0.0001 −0.0001
(0.001) (0.001)
DSO 0.0003 −0.0001
(0.001) (0.001)
DIO −0.001 −0.001∗
(0.001) (0.001)
DPO −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0004)
Growth −0.001 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Leverage −0.009 −0.009 −0.008 −0.008
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
FA Ratio 0.063∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.065∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Size 0.067∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Prb. Def. −0.182∗∗∗ −0.182∗∗∗ −0.182∗∗∗ −0.181∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Cash 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.009
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.6727 0.7225 0.6727 0.7225 0.6737 0.7235 0.6731 0.7231
Adjusted R2 0.6726 0.7221 0.6727 0.7221 0.6736 0.7231 0.673 0.7227
Observations 5,645 5,645 5,645 5,645 5,645 5,645 5,645 5,645
F Statistic 0.101 115.497∗∗∗ 0.425 115.484∗∗∗ 13.793∗∗∗ 118.217∗∗∗ 5.227∗∗ 117.060∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A0.3:
The Effect of Cash Conversion Cycle on Asset Turnover
The table show panel data regression models used to estimate the relationship between working
capital management and net operating asset turnover for Norwegian companies. Both public and
private companies are included in the sample, which contain 1,129 companies and 5,645 firm-year
observations in the time span of 2014 to 2018. Asset Turnover is regressed on each working capital
variabele in pairs of two. Models (1) and (2) show the overall effect of CCC, (3) and (4) depict
DSO, (5) and (6) look at DIO, and the two last models (7) and (8) focus on DPO. The first model in
each pair excludes time-variable control variables. Moreover, these variables are lagged by one year
and have been scaled to represent 10 days of capital outstanding. Furthermore, fixed firm and time
effects are included in every model, as indicated in the bottom panel of the table. Standard errors
clustered for firms and robust for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are displayed in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
Asset_turnover
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CCC −0.020 −0.021
(0.020) (0.020)
DSO 0.048 0.043
(0.069) (0.071)
DIO −0.032∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.012)
DPO 0.025 0.025
(0.022) (0.023)
Growth −0.028 −0.024 −0.028 −0.025
(0.054) (0.051) (0.053) (0.052)
Leverage −2.016 −1.986 −1.968 −2.036
(1.322) (1.330) (1.321) (1.313)
FA Ratio −2.810 −2.752 −2.785 −2.793
(6.366) (6.360) (6.362) (6.367)
Size 0.608 0.589 0.620 0.588
(0.594) (0.612) (0.594) (0.604)
Prb. Def. −1.002 −1.011 −0.998 −1.010
(1.407) (1.416) (1.406) (1.414)
Cash 0.296 0.284 0.271 0.310
(3.140) (3.160) (3.144) (3.143)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.4882 0.4886 0.4882 0.4887 0.4886 0.4886 0.4882 0.4886
Adjusted R2 0.4881 0.488 0.4882 0.488 0.4886 0.488 0.4881 0.488
Observations 5,645 5,645 5,645 5,645 5,645 5,645 5,645 5,645
F Statistic 0.267 0.575 0.460 0.584 0.340 0.579 0.300 0.574
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A0.4:
Working Capital Variables Regressed on Control Variables
for Norwegian Private Companies
The table contains panel data regressions used to retrieve fitted values for private companies
to be used in Welch’s t-tests, see section 4.2.3. The sample consists of 5,375 private company
firm-years derived from the period 2014 to 2018. The models include company specific
time-variant control variables and fixed firm and year effects. Standard errors clustered
for firms and robust for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are shown in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
CCC DSO DIO DPO
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Growth −0.219∗∗ −0.021 −0.129 0.069
(0.096) (0.049) (0.087) (0.050)
Size −1.800∗∗∗ −1.174∗∗∗ −1.358∗∗∗ −0.733∗∗∗
(0.356) (0.180) (0.320) (0.185)
Prb_def −1.074∗ 0.870∗∗∗ 0.331 2.275∗∗∗
(0.613) (0.310) (0.552) (0.319)
Leverage 2.153∗∗ −1.774∗∗∗ 0.910 −3.018∗∗∗
(0.979) (0.495) (0.882) (0.509)
FA Ratio −8.899∗∗∗ −5.997∗∗∗ −5.666∗∗∗ −2.764∗∗∗
(1.743) (0.882) (1.570) (0.906)
Cash −0.497 −0.126 −0.401 −0.030
(0.435) (0.220) (0.392) (0.226)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.9977 0.9973 0.998 0.9975
Adjusted R2 0.9977 0.9973 0.998 0.9975
Observations 5,375 5,375 5,375 5,375
F Statistic 10.421∗∗∗ 16.787∗∗∗ 6.166∗∗∗ 16.239∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A0.5:
Working Capital Variables Regressed on Control Variables
for Norwegian Public Companies
The table shows regression models where the working capital variables are explained by the
control variables and fixed effects for firms and years. Fitted values from the panel data regression
models are used in Welch’s t-tests in section 4.2.3. The sample consists of 270 firm-years for
public companies in the time-span 2014 to 2018. For all models, standard errors clustered
for firms and robust for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are shown in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
CCC DSO DIO DPO
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Growth 0.896∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.060
(0.256) (0.061) (0.182) (0.262)
Size 1.661 −0.563 −0.721 −2.945∗
(1.731) (0.411) (1.233) (1.772)
Prb_def −6.237 −2.732∗∗ −1.556 1.948
(4.538) (1.078) (3.233) (4.646)
Leverage −2.171 −0.132 4.914 6.953
(5.746) (1.366) (4.094) (5.882)
FA Ratio −3.518 1.671 −1.042 4.146
(8.811) (2.094) (6.278) (9.021)
Cash −0.760 1.357∗ −0.368 1.749
(3.410) (0.810) (2.430) (3.491)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.9987 0.9987 0.9988 0.9983
Adjusted R2 0.9986 0.9986 0.9988 0.9983
Observations 270 270 270 270
F Statistic 10.263∗∗∗ 77.302∗∗∗ 9.659∗∗∗ 2.881∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
